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CHAPTER I 
DAWN OF THE TRANSIT INDUSTRY 
The beginning of urban mass transitl in the United 
States can be traced to the early part of the 19th CenturI. 
One Abraham Brower, living in New York City, was 
probably the first person to earn a shilling in mass 
transportation in North Ameriel. In 1827 he had a 
carriage maker fashion a twelve seat, stagecoach-like 
vehicle which he operated on Broadway for a flat 5are 
of one shilling regardless of distance of travel. 
The use of carriages to transport groups of people 
fulfilled a need and soon spread throughout the cities of the 
East Coast. Soon improved types of coaches were introduced which 
were larger and more s11ited for the carrying of passengers. Among 
these was the "omnibus" which accommodated more people and whose 
superiority of construction over preceding models was quickly 
evident. It became the standard vehicle of the industry, and 
proved to be quite durable. Although the omnibus was to continue 
1 Urban Mass Transit - the author shall frequently 
refer to mass transIt, transportation, and traction, which he 
uses synonomously to mean the conveyance, upon payment of.a stated 
fare of people in groups, over fixed routes. 
2 "Transit Before the Turn of the Century", Mass 
Transportation, II, January, 1954, 38. ----
1 
2' 
in use for many years, and actually reached the peak of its oper-
ation just after the Civil War, its successor appeared as early 
as 1832. To exemplify the long usage of the omn1bus. in New York 
City the Fifth Avenue Coach Company operated omnibuses until 1908. 
HORSE CARS AND CABLES TO iWVE THE MANY 
As we have indicated, while use of the omnibus was to 
continue for years, the horse railway which waa to supplant it, 
was first introduced to the world 1n 1832. The.e vehicles were 
also horse drawn, but offered a much faster, smoother ride since 
they ran on iron wheels over iron rails. 
Development of the horse railways was slow until the 
1850's when acceptance began increasing. Though the seeds of the 
industry were sown in the horse coach era, it is in the develop· 
ment of the horse railway companies that we find the foundations 
of many of the mass transportation companies of today. Not only 
were they the immediate predecessors of present companies, but 
the story of their operations forecast for the modern transit 
operators the nature of the industry. The horse railways passed 
through a cycle similar to that which their successor was to meet. 
After the earliest of these companies proved their ability to pay 
dividends, a wave of ill-conmdered building and expansion oc-
curred, which soon proved to be unproritable. 
Another difficulty, equally pertinent to the later 
history or the electirc road, was soon encountered. It 
r 
.3 
became obvious during the Civil War and the period of 
high prices which followed, that a public utility whose 
system of prices is as much in the public eye as that 
of the street railway and whose services are purchased 
by all, has great difficulty in raising these prices, 
however great the emergency_ The street railway industry, 
during the period ot horse as well as electric traction, 
has on the whole benefited from falling prices and has 
never found a means during periods of rising prices, of 
increasing it recelpts3w1th enough rapidity to equal the increase 1n its costs. 
The service of the old horse railways was anything but 
comrortable by modern standards. The length of ride was short 
[because the operators learned that the early overexpansion was 
~nprofitable, and that areas which dId not yield sufficient reve-
~ues must remain unserviced. Riding In winter was hazardous since 
the cars were either unheated, or were warmed by an iron coal 
stove in the center. Use of this stove coupled mth the custom of 
~preading straw on the floor between the wooden benches led to not 
~ few fires and frights. 
In the period after the Civil War, when the omnibus was 
~ading in importance and the horse railways were beginning to gain 
~cceptanc., there also appeared a third milestone in transit de-
lVelopment. This innovation was the cable car, whose era of wide-
~pread use was to be briet.4 
3 E. S. Mason, !a! street Railwaz 12 Massachusetts, p ambridge, 1932. 
4 Cable cars are still used in San Fr~ncisco, but this 
continued use is probably attributable to local sentiment and as 
a tourist attraction. 
r 
4 
Passenger-carrying cable cars .ere introduced by Charles 
T. Harvey in Ne. York City in 1866 on his pioneer elevated line. 
Later the principle was applied in 1873 in San Francisco .here the 
cars operated on ground level. Cable car operation was much more 
expensive to install than horse railways, though less expensive 
to operate. Operation was accomplished by driving the cable on 
endless wire rope from a stationary steam engine in a powerhouse. 
The cable ran through a slotted tube in the middle of the tracks. 
Each cable car was equipped wi th a ft grip,ft which was applied to the 
, 
cable to move the car. a.nd was released by the tI gripman,t when 
necessary to stop. 
But even as use of the cable car spread, the development 
of electrically powered transit cars was proceeding. and was soon 
to a.chieve domination of the field of urban transportation for 
about a half-century. 
ELECTRIC CARS AND HIGH HOPES 
Experimentation with the use of electricity to power 
vehicles commenced early in the 19th century. 
Hardly more than 10 years after Michael Farrady had 
expounded the fundamental prinCiple of the electric 
motor. a Vermont blacksmith named Thomas Davenport had 
built a minia.ture electric car which made its first run 
on a small circular track carrying its own primary 
battery in 1834." 
5 Mass Transportation, January, 1954, p 39. 
r 
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~his and other experiments continued until efficiency progressed 
to a serviceable degree. 
Commercially feasible electrically powered street cars 
appeared in the 1880's, and improved design and construction 
merited a general conversion to electrical equipment in a short 
period. A Census of Street Railways in the United States in 1890, 
revealed that there were 1,260 miles of elevated operation, 5,700 
mil8s operated by animal power, and 500 mile. of cable. By 1902 
there were 22,000 miles of electric operation, 250 mile. of hors8 
6 
car track, and only a few miles of cable lines. 
With the commencement of electrically operated trolleys, 
the modern age of urban mass transport dawned. The new, heavier 
equipment offered a faster, more contortable ride, and soon public 
demand arose for even more service and more routes. 
Unfortuna.tely the spontaneous public acceptance proved 
to be a welcome opportunity to promote many shady deals. Real es-
tate promoters corUlived with unscrupulous transit operators to ex-
tend trackage to foster sale of suburban land tracts. However, 
where extensions Into new areas -"ere honestly planned and tai thtul" 
ly achieved, the result frequently was growth and development of 
new communities. For this service to the large urban areas the 
transit companies are to be commended. They played a vital part 
6 Transit in America, An undated release of the 
American Transit AssoCIatIon, ~. 
r 
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in the development of modern urban life. 
THE "EL" 
strange as it may seem today~ even in the mid 1800 t s 
~rbanites were beginning to be plagued by crowded street traffic 
!conditions. Clamor arose for some way to move people faster and 
lat the same time diminish the increasing otreet congestion. We 
~ave already alluded to Charles T. Harvey~ who in 1866 introduced 
an elevated cable car to New York City. This was an obvious 
~ttempt to offer rapid service above the street level. 
Latar experiments were made With steam locomotives to 
pull coaches on the elevated structures, and finally in 1895 an 
~lectrically powered elevated system made its appearance in 
~hicago. 
TRANSIT FRANCHISE 
It is of paramount importance to take cognizance of the 
f'act that transit companies stand in a peculiar relationship to 
vhe public. The public streets are used as right of way, and most 
~evenues of the companies are derived directly from individuals, 
~ach of whom has certain l-ights and privileges relative to all 
~ublic streets, and each of whom possesses the privilege of e-
~ecting those who will be responsible for regulation of street use. ' 
';arly recogni tion of this relationship by local governments led to 
7 
contracts or franchises issued by the political subdivision and 
accepted by the indl vidual c om.p any • In many cOlnmuni ties they be-
came cOl:lplex documents covering not only the pt:lrmissible fare to 
be charged, but also covering the type of service to be rendered, 
and the amounts to be paid for use of the streets. Yet, the 
efforts to control the transit operators through the use of 
franchise were not very successful. Public officials connived 
with operators to circumvent the franchises. Public opinion 
finally insisted on the establishment of permanent regulatory 
commissions to compel the cornpanies to fulfill in their franchise 
obligations. 
TABLE 1* 
NEW PASSENGER EQUIPMENT DELIVERED TO TRANSIT COMPANIES 
IN TH,E UNITED STATES - 1938 TO 1951 
Railway Cars 
Calendar Subway & Trolley Motor Grand 
Year Surface Elevated Total Coaches Buses Total 
1938 145 250 295 377 ito * 
1939 371 123 494 152 *' if' 
1940 463 189 652 618 3,984 5,2$4 
1941 462 0 462 227 5,600 6,289 
1942 284 0 284 3.56 7,200 7,840 
1943 32 0 32 116 1,251 1,399 
1944 284 0 284 60 3,807 J+,151 
1945 332 0 332 161 4,414-1 4,934 
1946 421 0 421 266 6,463 7,150 
1947 626 2 628 955 12,029 13,612 
1914-8 478 248 726 1,430 7,009 9,165 
1949 273 415 688 680 3,358 4,726 
1950 4 199 203 179 2,668 3,050 
1951 56 140 196 600 4,552 5,348 
1952 19 0 19 224 1,749 1,992 
1953 0 0 0 0 2,246 2,246 
*Data on Motor Buses not available. 
* Transit Fact Book, 1952, Table 17 and Transit Fact 
~, 1954, Table 18.---- ---- ----
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ENTER THE BUS 
The last major shift in transit vehicles was the con-
version of operations from street car use to bus use. V:otor 
busses were first operated in urban transi t about lS05 by the Fiftl 
Avenue Coach Company of New York City. The oarly busses were 
crude, uncomfortable and generally unreliable for continuous 
service. With low wages and an abunda.nce of modere.tely priced 
materials there was no great interest displayed in bU2 use in the 
first quarter of this century. "By 1920 there were still only a-
bout sixty (motor busses) operated by ten trolley oompanies 
throughout the country.n1 
The impetus to investigate the possibilIties of bus 
transportation really resulted from rising costs and increasing 
trarfic congestion. As these conditions continued to pressure 
transit managements, a general movement to bus utilization began. 
This major shirt began in the 1930's, and gained momentum until 
the outbreak of World War II. During the war new eqUipment was 
produced, out on a limited scale, so that conversion to bus oper-
ation awaited the coming of peace. The new equipment, consisting 
chiefly of busses, answerert tile industryts need for a more flexi-
ble vehicle, less subject to traffic delay than the track bound 
street car. 
7 Transit in America, An undated release of the 
American Transit AssoCIation, 7. 
CHAPTER II 
EARLY OVERCAPITALIZATION 
The transit companies of the late 19th Century were in 
general heavily overcapitalized. The causes were many and natu-
rally varied from company to company. Among the reasons for this 
unbalanced financial condition were overbuilding, watered stock 
and rapid replacement of equipment. Overextension of transit 
lines is attributable to an overoptimistic view of transportation 
needs; to ventures by irresponsible promoters to sell real estate 
in suburban areas; and to profit from constructions. 
OVERCONSTRUCTION 
The overoptimism which led to overconstruction is under-
standable. Everyone at the time felt that transit was an inex-
haustible gold mine. Certainly we can defend too, honest cooper-
ation with real estate men to develop new living areas. But out 
and out grafting also existed in construction. Another reason for 
overcapitalization due to overbuilding resulted from the necessary 
consolidation ot competing companies neither of which could profit 
from their operations. Short sighted indeed, but many competitors 
used different gauges in laying rail, which had to be rectified 
subsequently, An additional reason for swollen construction costs 
10 
11 
was the necessity of installing heavier track for use by newer 
equipment. 
It seems clear that overbuilding in its various forma 
has been one of the most important factors in swelling 
the capitalization and the construction accounts of the 
electric railways. Its effect upon credit could not 
have been otherwise than adverse and cumulative, par-
tIcularly wnen the i~dawned upon the horiZon of the 
street railway investor that many street railway lines 
and an enormous amount of street railway equipment were 
becoming obsolete as a result of automobile competition 
and a sharp reversal oflthe tendency of development in 
the street railway art. 
WATERED STOCK 
The transit companies, in what has been called the 
Golden Days of Transit, also attracted unscrupulous and dishonest 
men who added to capitalization for their own profit. A tactic 
frequently used to achieve this was the establishment of a holding I 
comp"ny. 
The organizers of the holding companies capitalized 
future earnings, 1rhich never were realized, by the issu-
ance to themselves of stocks and bonds which represented 
no return investment. One of the outstanding examples 
was that of the Metropolitan Traction Co. of whom P. A. 
B. Widener, Thoma. Dolan and W. L. Elkins were the leading 
spirits. This group first gained control ot the surface 
railways of Philadelphia and other cit!es" and then, joined by William C. Whitney, and Thomas F. Ryan, turned 
their attent10n to New York City. Here they quickly 
succeeded in consolidating all the surface lines in 
Manhattan and the Bronx, making huge fortunes for them-
1 D. F. Wilcox, Analysis £f ~ Electric Railwal 
~roblem, New York, 1921, 66. 
12 
selves In the process. F10r example, the holding company 
company acquired control of a railway on Thirty-Fourth 
street worth :ji;lOO,OOO and issued $2,000,000 In stocks 
and bonds secured by this property. The Metropolitan Street 
Railway Company, likewise controlled by this group, was 
compelled to pay $2,000,000 in cash for these securities 
and in ord~r to get the money had to sell its own stocks 
and bonds. 
There are numerous instances of directors issuing stock 
to city council-men to obtain more favorable franchises. Even 
these tactics were not entirely controlled by state regulatory 
commissions since their task was generally restricted to control 
of service and limitation of earning power. The conunisslons usu-
ally did not heed the amount of capitalization, hence promoters 
increased capitalization for their own profit. Many years later 
the Federal Securities and Exchange Commission was able to control 
this situation rather effectively. 
The purchase of rolling stock is another area in which 
the student or transit history can see the tendency to overcapi-
talize. It must be understood that about the turn of the century, 
and even during the decade before, the vehicles of the transit 
companies were undergoing radical improvement. Larger cars, heavi-
er trucks, safety cars, etc., were being introduced. The new 
equipment was rrequently purchased and put into service long baror, 
the cost of displaced eqUipment was amortized. 
2 "Municipal TranSit," Social Science Encyclopedia, 
VI, 120. 
1.3 
In time the early overcapitalization had the effect of 
destroying credit. With credit gone, and new capital needed, 
transit companies were in difficult straits. In the final analy-
sis the basis of credit is earning power, and the existence of 
physical transit property and equipn16nt is of transient import. 
The property must be accompanied by an ability to earn so much as 
to assure a reasonable return. OtherWise, needed capital cannot 
be attracted. The 108S of earning ability will be considered in 
detail later. Suffice it to say that the ini'lation of the World 
War I period and the beginning of automobile competition serious-
ly cut the earning power of transit.) 
MAINTENANCE OMITTED 
Prior to the inflation of this war period, the operators I 
had been able to meet the problem of credit and capitalization 
throu~l the expedient of neglecting maintenance of their equipment 
and failing to amortize in order to pay dividends • 
.3 D. Fl. Wilcox, Anal~.i8of the Electric Railwaz 
Problem, liew York, 1921, 120, " or convenIence in discussIng the 
trend of general prices, it should be noted that the labor de-
partment takes the prices of 1913 as 100, and that the 1913 index 
represented very nearly the average for the five years immediately 
preceding the rise in prices due to the war; also that the index 
number at the low price level in 1896 was approximately 66, and 
that in December, 1919, the index number had risen to 237. 11 
(Wholesale commodity price index.) 
But with the war emergency, costs soared, labor demanded 
increased wages, cost of materials rose, and the tares remained 
stationary until the state Commerce Commissions or other governing 
bodies permitted an increase. 
Requests for tare increases seldom received prompt at-
tention. The relief granted was frequently inadequate, and was 
sometimes denied. 
The culmination ot these pressures on the transit compa-
nies was a tinancial collapse. Many companies filed bankruptcy 
proceedings, when permitted; many small operators discontinued 
operations completely; and other abandoned lines which were 
unprofitable. 
The establishment of receivership under bankruptcy did 
not relieve· most operators of the obligations to provide service 
which he.d been accepted under their franchises. It is possible to 
continue functioning in such cases as long as operating income 
covers operating costs, i.e., l~bor costs, power, and indispensibl. 
maintenance, although it means steadily deteriorating equipment 
and lessened ability to recuperate 1n a more favorable economic 
climate. 
With receivership also came reorganization plans to 
correct abuses, attract capital, and once more set the company on 
a stable financial footing. Many reorganizations succeeded in 
squeezing water from the stock. 
15 
The improved financial status frequently came too late 
to permit the company to benefit from increased patronage but 
~erely in time to see the maturation of the industry's con~etitor. 
REGULATORY BODIES 
In the brief history of transit in Chapter I we indi-
cated that a franchise is a recognition of the relationship of the 
transit conlpany to the public. It is a contract between a govern-
mental body and a commercial enterprise which permits the latter 
to construct utility plants and to operate for a stated period. 
The terms of the contract specify the streets which can be util-
ized, and the manner in which service is to be provided. In most 
cases the franohises were granted by muniCipalities, though 80me 
were direot grants from state legislatures. The usual life of a 
franohise is from twenty to twenty-rive years, though in some 
cases it is longer. Some states permitted issuance of perpetual 
grants. 
Among the matters stipulated in a typical franchise we 
find provisions fixing standards of service and rates of fare; 
control of extension of existing lines; specifications for the 
type of equipment; regulation of ticket sales and transfers; and 
such things a8 snow removal and street sprinkling. 
The power of the municipality to grant or renew 
franchises is an important factor In relation to financial stabi-
16 
1ity of a transit property. ~hi1e it may be argued that issuance 
of short term contracts allows the city to revise various sections 
to bring it up to date, this short lIre contract proved a serious 
impediment in rinancing. Many investors would not consider in-
vesting in transportation securities in the late years or a 
franchise since the request for a renewal might not be honored. 
Indeed, years sometimes passed before a new contract 
was signed. The result ot this caprice was destruction or credit. 
As early as 1907 there was a realization that rranchises had 
railed to regulate the street railways. The state ot Wisconsin 
in 1907 enlarged the scope or the Railway Commission to include 
control of the street railways. Soon this method of controlling 
transi t companies spread throughout the COuntI'Y; boards or com-
missions regulated the service to be furnished and the rates of 
rare of the individual utilities. 
The Commissions were established primarily to sareguard 
the intereats of the public. Although in soma cases control of 
the transit companies was motivated by a desire of the public to 
share what they considered were high profits being made by the 
companies. 
be denied. 
Certainly the need for control of some sort could not 
These bodies accomplished many of the original ends 
ror whieh they were instituted. Unscrupulous promoters were con-
trolled and better relations between C orr,panies and muniCipal 
governments were promoted. 
17 
Rowever, with the growing inflation of the period pre-
ceedlng World ~ar I, these bodies proved that they were incapable 
of coping with the demands of the public for cheap service, and 
the real need of the operating companies for relief from the 
rising costs of operation. 
One attempt to strengthen transit in these inflation-
ary times was the service at cost franchise. This was an a-
greement between the company and the municipality on a reasonable 
capitalization figure and a fixed rate of return on securities. 
The new approach to a mutually acceptable franchise was 
even more comprehensive than the short term type. It provided a 
rate of tare sufficiently hl~l to pay all costs of operation, 
including servicing the investment. The method of accounting was 
even detailed in some instances. It also provided for schedules 
of tare increases if certain conditions were met. 
One difficulty which developed was the inadequacy of the 
perm1ssible fare increases. Taxes and inflated costs cut oper-
ating income until stipulated obligations could not be fulfilled, 
and appeal for relief had to be made. Another difficulty with the 
service at cost franchise was the gradual but growing discontent 
of investors over the fixed return. This growing dissatisfaction 
frequently led to refusal of transit companies to renew service 
at cost franChises. 
CHAP1'ER III 
MONOPOLY t S C()l.;},ETITOR 
So much has been written about monopoly in American eco-
nomics. that it is interesting to note the parodox of at least one 
public utility which has long been regulated as monopolistic and 
yet has sufrered grievously at the hands of a competition. 
THE JITNEY 
The monopoly or urban mass transportation has been a 
myth ror years. The errects of 'automobile competition were first 
felt about 1914 when private automobiles were used as a common 
carrier to transport groups of people. Jitney is the term often 
applied to such vehicles. Jitneys probably originated in 
Los Angeles and soon spread allover the country. Before they 
subsided, they made serious inroads in the transit industry's 
profits. Jitneys diminished in importance as a competitor of 
public mass transit when it gr'adually became evident to ji tney 
operators that they could not amortize the cost of their vehicle 
and still profit on their low fare. But with the culmination of 
World War I. increased automobile production and the convenience 
offered by private autos appealed to many people; the private car 
began to 'catch ont. In the Unite<i states in 1915 there were only 
18 
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2,332,000 cars and taxis registered; by 1923 the registrations 
increased to 13,253,000, and by 1949 reached the staggering total 
of 36,293,000 registrations. 
r 
TABLE 11* 
MOTOH VEHICLE REGISTRATIONS: 1S/00 TO 1949 
Year 
1900 
1905 
1910 
1915 
1920 
192;3 
1924 
192.5 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
19.39 
1940 
1941 
1942 
194.3 
1944 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
Registrations 
(in thousands) 
Total 
(Excl. 
Publicly 
Owned) 
8 
79 
469 
2,491 
9,239 
15,102 
17,614 
19,94i 
22,053 
~'140 ,572 2 ,503 
26,532 
25,862 
~;;,877 ~,954 
20,230 
28,172 
29,706 
29,Jili3 
30,6i5 
32,0.35 
31+,472 
.32,579 
.30,500 
30,086 
30,6~8 
.33,9 6 
;37.3 ° 40,542 
44,120 
Passen-
ger Car, 
& Taxis) 
8 
77 
458 
2,332 
8,132 
13,253 
15,4.36 
17,440 
19,221 
20,142 
21,308 
23,060 
22,973 
22.330 
20,586 
21.472 
22,495 
24,10B 
25,391 
25,167 
26,140 
27,372 
29,524 
27,869 
25'~13 35, 66 
25, 91 
28,100 
30,719 
33,201 
36,293 
Motor 
Trucks & 
Busses3 
1: 
10 
159 
1,108 
1,849 
2,177 
2,501 
2,832 
2,99
4
7 
3,20 
3,442 
3,559 
3,532 
3,290 
3,482 
l:6~ 
4.315 44,~7~ 
) , 667 4, 3 
4,91+8 
J4-,710 
44'6547 I 20 4,947 5,846 
6,642 
7,341
8 7,82 
20 
* U.S. Census Department, Statistical Abstract ~ ~ 
United States: 1951, No. 576, 72nd EdItIon, 487. 
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The severity of the automobile competition was shocking-
ly evident during the early 1930's. Many transit companies were 
compelled to file bankruptcy proceedings. 
The load of these woes has proved too much for many 
transi t companies to bear. In the early thirties the 
mortality was staggering. Between 19)0 and 1933, 
nearly seventy major systct'J!l, operating more than 7,000 
miles of Single track went into bankruptcy. Well over 
a billion dollars iO transit stocks and bonds WEu'e 
adversely affected.) 
DECLINE DJ RIDING 
The severity of decline in transit riding is illustrated 
below. In a rapidly increasing urban population transit ride. 
per capita have been plummeting. While these statistics on 
transit riding do not convey the immediate financial picture of 
the industry, they forcefully depict the trend of the riding habit 
and may forecast the future of a fallen monopoly • 
.3 R. M. Bleibers, "Sic Transit Gloria lf , Barron's 
~ati~2l!! Business ~ Financial ~eeklYI Way 1, 1950, 5. 
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'IABLE 111* 
URBAN POPULl,'rrObl, TOTAL RIDBS AND RIDES PEH CAPITA 
1924 TO 1951 INCL. 
Year Urban Total Rides Indexes 
Popu- Rides Per Capi- (1924=100) 
la.tion ta of Popu- Rides Rides 
(Millions) Popu- lation Per (LUllions) lation Capi ta 
1924 60.1 16,301 271 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1925 61.6 16,651 270 102.5 102.1 99.6 
1926 6r 17,234 274 104.8 105.7 101.1 1927  .5 17,201 267 107.~ 10~.5 98.5 1928 6 .0 16,989 257 109. ' 104-. 2 91+.8 
1929 67.5 16,985 252 112.3 104.2 93.0 
1930 69.0 15,567 226 114.8 95.~ 83.~ 1931 69.5 13,9211- :200 115.6 85. 73. 
1932 70.0 12,025 172 116.5 73. 63.5 
193~ 70.6 11,327 160 117.5 69.5 59.0 193+ 71.1 12,038 169 118.3 73.8 62.'+ 
1935 71.7 12,226 171 119.3 75.0 63.1 
1936 72.2 13,146 182 120.1 80.6 67.2 
1937 72.8 13,2,'+6 182 121.1 el.3 67.2 
1938 73.3 12,61+5 17~ 122.0 'l7~6 6~.8 19~9 7~.p 12,83A 17 123.0 68•7 6 .2 19 0 7 .4- 1~,09 17 123.8 0.4 64., 
1941 75.1 1~,085 188 125.0 86.4 69. 
1942 75.3 1 ,000 239 125.3 110.Ji- 08.2 i~ 7('.7 22,000 291 126.0 1~5.0 107.4 7q..6 23,017 309 124.1 1 1.2 114.0 
1945 74.5 23,254 312 124.0 142.7 11 -'.1 
1946 82.8 23,372 282 137.8 143.14- 10~.1 
1947 8~.9 22,5~0 269 1~9.6 138.3 99.) 1948 8 .7 21,3 8 252 1 0.9 131.1 93.0 
1949 8 .6 19,008 219 144.1 116.6 80.8 
1950 88.4 17,246 195 147.1 105.8 72.0 
1951 89.5 16,125 180 148.9 98.9 66.~ 1952 90.6 15,119 167 150.7 92.7 61. 
1953 91.1 13,902 153 151.6 85.3 56.5 
New Yorlr, 
* Transit ~ Books, American Transit Association, 
Prepared .3: pressnt19d to the author. 
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STREE'l' . CONGESTION 
The oompetition of automobiles has had a more profound 
effec t upon the local transit industry than can be indioated by 
statistics of decreasing riding. The street congestion of the 
American city today greatly increases the operating costs of tran-
sit vehicles. Private cars not only compete with transit for 
riders but also for every foot of area of public streets. In-
creased traffic congestion delays the passage of public transi t 
vehicles to the extent that additionalbussesor cars must be added 
to the schedule to maintain regular intervals of servia., whether 
the riding density requires it or not. 
The extent of potential mass transit riding is sub-
stantial as seen in the increase in urban population from about 
sixty million people in 1924 to approximately eighty.seven million 
people in 1951. The maximum riding volume is probably accurately 
indicated by the figures on total riding during World War II. The 
war time increase was. of course, a direct result of controls on 
auto production and gasoline and tire rationing. The preCipitous 
decline in riding when wartime controls were removed is further 
evidence of the appeal of the automobile and the resultant losses 
in transit riding. 
TABLE IV* 
RESUVrS OF TRANSrf OPEHA'IIIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 
1932 TO 1953 INCLUSIVE 
Per Cent ot 
Operating Revenue 
Operating Net Operating 
Year Operating Expenses Revenue Ta..xes Operating Expenses All Oper-
Revenue (Inc. Income (Ine. Taxes ating 
Depree.) Deprec. ) Income 
(Thousands) (Thousands) (Thousands) (Thousands) (Thousands) 
1932 $ ~6,490 $ 562,850 $ 133,6~0 $ C.~I. 021 82,619 80.81% 1.33% 11.86% 
19~ 2,400 502,420 hl9.~uO tt1,3bo 92,610 18.21 1.31 lli:~ 19 6A4'KOO 52~,490 9,4-10 9,1 3 100,221 7~.86 1.29 1935  1, 00 53Lh9g0 ~6,410 50.458 96,012 1 .50 1.~1 14.09 1936 121,900 505,1 0 1 2,120 56,920 105,800 17.05 1. 2 l4..53 
1931 133,500 588,680 144,820 63,504 81,316 80.26 8.66 11.09 
1938 100,800 579,690 121,110 65,72) 55,381 82.72 9.38 1.90 
19?,9 720,700 586,600 13i,100 67,~99 66,601 81·iK 9.37 9.24 
194-0 737,000 5Q8,030 13 ,970 62, 88 76,282 81. B.51 10.35 
1941 800,300 6~4,260 156,Q40 66,803 89,231 80.50 8.35 11.15 
1942 1,040,000 1 9,390 270,610 128.6~0 141,900 73.98 l2'r 13.65 194(. 1,294.000 932,910 361,030 186,3 0 174,690 72.10 14. 0 13.50 19J~ 1,362,~00 1,012,010 350,230 184,250 160,980 74.29 13. 9 11.82 1945 1,380, 00 1,061,~O 313,260 16 ,530 148,130 71.31 11.92 10.77 
1946 1,397,100 1,129,4~O 261,670 129,020 1?8,650 80.8,5 9.23 9.92 
194~ 1,~901~OO 1,2,8,7 0 lQ!,060 104,940 ~7,120 89.07 7.55 3.3~ 191+ 1, 88,600 1,3 3,651 1 ,949 101,210 %3,739 90.26 6.80 2.9 
1949 1,490,900 1,338,)27 152, cr.) 88,908 ),665 89.76 5.96 4.21 
1950 1,452,100 1,296,687 IgS ~ 89,<*4 66,369 89.29 6.1) 4.51 1951 1,472,700 1,331,272 1 1:42 95,340 '+6,088 90.40 6.47 ).13 
1952 1,501,300 1,369,565 ~1,735 101,986 29,749 91.23 6.79 1.98 
1953 1,512,800 1,370,707 2,093 97,.348 41+,745 90.61 6.43 2.96 
* 
The American Transit Association, Transit Fact Book, ed. to the Author. 
--
" 
The seriousness of the decline of riding after l,~orld War 
II is quite evident when we peruse the results of transit oper-
ations. In 1952 operating expenses stood at an all time high of 
91.23 per cent of operating revenue. While the percentage of 
operating revenue devoted to taxes declined from the World War II 
high; the operating income was at an all time low of about 2 per 
cent. 
TRANSIT VEHICLES AGAIN 
Obviously this trend toward lessened riding and de-
creased income after expenses could not continue indefinitely. 
In an effort to improve the financial stability after the War, the 
industry moved to replace two man street cars with one man busses, 
in order to increase the ability to combat traffic and reduce 
labor costs. Rolling stock was in disrepair and required re-
placement in any event. The abrupt drop in transit riders after 
the war made it extremely difficult to finance this new equipment. 
The table below illustrates the change 1n the type of vehicle 
used by mass transit. 
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'lIABLE V* 
~E~DS Ol;' PAS.sEHGER EQuIrMEN~' IN THE UUIT'ED STATES 
1926 TO 1953 
Railway Cars 
Calen- Subway 
dar and Trolley Motor Grand 
Year SUl"'i"ace Elevated Total Ooach Bue !J.'ota,l 
1926 62,857 8.909 71,766 ... 14,400 86,166 
1927 61,379 8,957 "/0,336 .. 18,000 88,336 
1928 58,940 8,511 68,551 41 19,700 138,292 
1929 56,980 9.~,H33 66,963 57 21,100 88,120 
1930 55,150 9,640 64,790 173 21,300 86,263 
1931 53,120 9,638 62,758 225 20,700 83,883 
1932 49,500 10,434 59,934 259 20,800 80,403 
1933 47,700 10,424 58,124 310 20,200 78,634 
1934 43,700 10,418 54,118 441 22,200 76,759 
1935 40 .. 050 10,416 50,466 57S 23,800 74,844 
1936 37,180 lO,92~ 48,103 1,136 26,800 76,039 
1937 34,180 11,032 45,212 1,.655 27,500 74,367 
1938 31,400 11,205 42,605 2,032 28,500 73,137 
1939 29,320 11,052 40,372 2,184 32,600 75,156 
1940 26,630 11,032 37,662 2,802 35,000 '75,464 
1941 27,092 10,578 36,670 3,029 39,300 79,999 
1942 27,230 10,278 37,508 3,385 48,000 86,893 
1943 27,250 10,255 37,505 3,501 47,100 88,106 
1944 26,980 10,219 37,199 3,561 48,400 89,160 
1946 24,050 9,429 33,470 3,916 52,450 89,845 
1947 20,78a 9,370 30,158 4,707 56,917 91,782 
1948 16.824 9,456 26,280 5,687 58,540 90,507 
1949 14,859 9,869 24,728 6,366 5'7,035 88,129 
1950 13,228 9,758 22,986 6,504 56,820 86,310 
1951 10,960 9:J M 4 20.801 7,071 57,660 85,335 
1952 9,700 9.476 19,176 7,180 55,980 82,336 
1953 7,990 9,244 17,234 6,941 54,700 78,885 
,< 
* The American Transit ASSOCiation, Transit Faot 
Book, ad. to the Author. 
Before leaving the consideration of heavy traffic, de-
clIning riding due to automotive competition, and the increased 
burden of replacement of trackbound cars with more flexible busses, 
it is imperative to reiterate that in times of inflation mass 
transit has grave difficulty in managing. If the present decline 
in riding and increase in costs, with coneommitant reduction in 
net revenue continues strong measures must be taken to preserve thE 
~ass transit industry, which definitely offers a vital service to 
many millions of urban residents. 
The question of why the average transit rider is prone 
to forsake transit for use of his private auto has been discussed 
frequently in the industry. Undoubtedly the industry itself is 
partiallYl"8sponsible, through f ailing to provide attractive 
service and nlore comfortable vehicles. However, the reason which 
seems to offer explanation suitable to most cases is the intensive 
selling job p~rto~ed by the automobile industry. Comfort, flex-
ibility, and independence were so stressed that laok of an auto or 
~se of public transit vehicles seemed to carry a stigma. Also 
worthy of note is the subsidy provided the automotive industry by 
local, state, and federal government, through use of public funds 
to build highways. Untold millions have been expended t;or road 
programs, and, today, many large cities are extendins additional 
millions for oonstruction of parking facilities. 
CHAPTER IV 
COSTS---CHIEF'LY LABOR 
Rising costs with a declining volume of business spell 
trouble in any venture. Mass transit has been spared neither. 
Over the years operating costs have increased significantly and as 
we have seen the volume of transit passengers has been declining 
preCipitously. 
A major reason for the increase in these operating costs 
is the increase in wages for transit employees. Labor payroll 
accounts for well over half of the total operating costs. Basi-
cally the industry is in the business of selling labor, and wage 
increases have greater significance than an equal rise in the 
chemical or plastic industry. 
The price of labor today is an extremely important 
factor in all transit management deCisions, yet such was not 
always the case. In the opinion of many the large profits made 
by transportation companies in the early days of the industry was 
due to the oheap cost of labor. "street railway profits in the 
early days were largely the product of low wages and long hours of 
labor for the men engaged in street railway service,,,l The life 
113. 
1 Wilcox, AnalYSis of !h! 8lectric RailwaI Problem, 
28 
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of transit operating employees was difficult; low wages, long 
hours, and dangerous, unhealthful working conditions were prevalen 
Through formation of unions, the men improved their lot appreci-
ably over the years. 2 The pressure of economic necessity, and the 
de.ire for increased oompensation to improve the members' standard 
of living resulted in a continuing increase in wages and benefits. 
As wages rose the transit operators were compelled to economize. 
The inauguration of one man operation of transit vehicles was one 
of the many approaches to cutting costs. 
INCREASED WAGES 
One means of securing an inSight into the increase in 
transit labor costs is to consider the increase in the hourly rate 
of pay of trainmen. The Bureau of Labor Statistics for many years 
has prepared a report on union wages for transit operating employ-
ees. The report of October, 19$2 presents an index of these 
hourly wages, with an average of the wages of the years 1~~7, 1948 
and 1949 .~ual to 100. On this basis the wages of trainmen 
2 A very interesting and informative study of the role 
of unionism among transit employees was made by Rev. W. Larkin in 
"Thirty Years of Collective Bargaining and Arbitration between the 
~hieago Surface Lines and Its Tral~n." Master TheSis, I.S.I.R., 
Loyola University, Chicago. It is reoommended to those who seek 
a detailed account of the achievements of transit employees 
through their union. 
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increased well over 100 per cent from 1929 to 1952. Even during 
the worst depression years of the 1930's wages did not diminish 
substantially, and within five years, that is by 1937, were 
h1.gher than the rates of 1929. 
TABLE VI*' 
INDEXES OF HOURLY WAGE RATES OF 
LOCAL TRANSIT OPERATING EMPLOYEES 1929-52 
(Oct. 1, 1947-1+8-49=100) 
Date 
1929; May 15 
1930; May 15 
1931; May 15 
1932; May 15 
1933; May 15 
19.34; May 15 
1935; May 15 
1936; May 15 
1937: .ay 15 
1938; June 1 
1939; June 1 
1940; June 1 
1941; June 1 
1942; July 1 
1943; July 11 
19W4.; July 1 
1945; July 1 
1946; July 1 
1947; Oct. 1 
1948; Oct. 1 
1949; Oct. 1 
1950; Oct. 1 
1951; Oct. 1 
1952; Oct. 1 
Index 
52.4 
52.9 
52.9 
51.9 
(Information not available) 
50.4 
52 • .3 
52.7 55.2 
56.8 
57.2 
57.9 
60.0 
~~:i 
69.1 
69.9 
81·9 
92.4 
101.7 
105.9 
110.9 
118.2 
127.0 
* Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Wiget and Hour 
~oca1 Transit Operatins Emi?loyees: 1952,'FibIe • .--
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SOME COMMON WAGE PROVISIONS 
A consideration of basic hourly rates is, or at least cal 
be, misleading when discussing trainmen's wages. Because of the 
large number of people traveling during morning and evening rush 
hour periods, it is necessary to split the dayts work to meet the 
service demand. :Most union contracts have clauses limiting the 
number of these split runs. ~oreover, an added cost is frequently 
imposed on the operating company if these splits exceed a stipu-
lated numbers of hours. 
Another means whereby wage costs are increased is by a 
stipulated meal relief penalty. Contracts frequently provide for 
a break in the day's work. at an interval of not more than five or 
five and one-half hours. If an emergency occurs which prolongs a 
portion of the day's work beyond the agreed period the employee is 
paid at full rate for his lunch period. 
In common with many other industriesthe transit industry 
has wage differential provisions for night work. It 1s usually 
explained as a night premium for runs finishing after an agreed 
hour. 
LABOR BILL OF THE INDUSTRY 
Consideration of labor costs would be incomplete without 
a discussion of the labor bill annually met by the industry. SinC4 
1931 the lowest average annual wage received by transit employees 
.32 
was 1.41+2, in 1933; yet the total wage costs amounted to almost 
three hundred millIon dollars. By 1953 the total annual wage. 
amounted to nine hundred thirteen million dollars. a nd the average 
annual wage had risen to ~~l+, 150. 
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TABLE VII* 
NUMBER OF EllPLOTBES, ANNUAL PAYROLL Arm AVEP,AGE ANNUAL 
EARNINGS PER EUPLOYEE IN THE 'l'RANSIT INDU$TRY OF' THE 
UNITED STATES - 1931-1953 
Year Average Payroll Average 
No. ot Annual Earnings 
Employees Per Employee 
1931 250,000 ~,ooo,ooo 1,692 
1932 222,000 ,000,000 1,~0 19~ 206,000 297,000,000 1, 2 19 211,000 314,000,000 1,448 
1935 209,000 321,000,000 1,$36 
1936 212,000 338,000,000 1,5~~ 1937 215,000 3$6,000,000 1,65 
1938 207,000 351,000,000 1,646 19~9 204,000 356,000,000 1,7 5 
19 ° 20),000 )60,000,000 l'~A3 1941 205,000 ~86,OOO,OOO 1, 2 
1942 219,000 62,000,000 2,110 
191M 2~9,OOO 554,000,000 2.~18 19- :2 2,000 599,000,000 2, 75 
1945 ~~,ooo 6)2,000,000 2, 12 
1946 2 1,000 713,000,000 2,732 
1947 266,000 790,000,000 2,970 
1948 261,000 829,000,000 3,176 
1949 ~3,OOO 841,000,000 3,,24 1950 0,000 835,000,000 ), 19 
1951 232,000 872,000,000 3,760 
1952 221,000 903,000,000 ?,,978 
1953 220,000 91),000,000 4,150 
The huge labor bill paid by the transit industry has 
prompted 80me members or the industry to attribute the weakening 
financial status solely to this steadily climbing cost. These 
comments are often seen in print about contract negotiation time. 
Since these notions are representative of the thought of a segment 
of the industry the proposition requires an answer. 
MORAL RIGHT TO A ]ir'AIR WAGE 
~hile it is legally and morally within the province or 
a transit operator to negotiate a ravorable wage rate, it is also 
incumbent upon him to supply his men a living wage, the question 
of relative profit not withstanding. Merely because men are em-
ployed by a public utility, they do not surrender their right to 
receive a just wage or to bargain for equal compensation for simi-
lar work of comparable quality as performed in priVate companies. 
Social justice could not require a penalty for supplying Ii neces-
sary public service. If private transit cannot pay living wages 
and still make a profit for investors, then private transit must 
be succeeded or must discontinue operations. It's unjust and 
unreasonable to expect such a sacrifice by employees of n public 
utility.) 
) An interesting and inrormative study of industrial 
relations in the transit industry is Labor Relations in the 
New York Rapid Transit 3ystems 1934-1941+, James J. Me Ginley 
S.J., King's Crown Press, 1949. 
----------- -
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TAXATION 
Another considerable cost met by the in4ustry is taxes. 
~e beginning of taxat.1.on of transit W8.S the acceptance of the 
proffered first franchise. The taxes il21posed by franchise were 
~any, and they have increased as franchises have been renewed and 
~s succeeding levels of government added to the tax burden. 
Aside from the general taxes paid by all corporations, 
~ransit has many special burdens. These burdens are ot two types, 
~pecial taxes and special duties. The taxes reserved tor transit 
alone are often referred to within the industry as 'oppressive 
~axest. Among theae 'oppressive taxes' are levies for street 
sprinkling, use of bridges, gross receipt tranchise taxes, and 
nany more. 
Transit companies pay an astonishing amount in taxes, 
many of them local leVies, going back to the days ot 
the horse cars. Out of morbid curiosity, the Kansas 
City Public Service Company one day totaled them up, 
and found it was paying no tewer than eighty-six 
distinct taxes, including tranchises, citY4gas tax, 
bridge use taxes, and special assessments. 
The llnposl tion of specIal duties, which would neces-
sarily have to be performed by the municipal government, if 
"ransportatlon companies were not requIred to supply t~lem, is even 
nora onerous to most transit properties than the taxes levied. 
4 R. M. Bleiberg, "Sic Transit Gloria", Barron's 
~ational ~u8ine88 ~ Financial Weekly, May 1, 1950, 5. 
The obligation to repave streets 1s one ot these. The resentment 
ot transit companies to provide such service is particularly 
strong today when most transit vehicles on the city streets are 
rubber tired. The original municipal thinking was that transit 
vehicles subjected the streets to greater wear. Today transit 
vehicles like automobiles run on rubber, yet they must resurface 
streets (or portions thereof) which obviously are more used by 
the autos. The burden of payment 18 doubly onerOU.8 since transit 
riders are paying not only the cost of transportation but are 
paying to provide a smooth thoroughfare for all other traftic. 
Vfuere state law imposes a gas tax tor road building and repair 
transit also pays the tax. 
The franchise obligation to remove snow from transit 
streets is another eX&rtlple of muniCipal d.uties which have been 
delegated to transit companies. Snow removal i8 a very expensive 
operation. It necessitates the purchase of very specialized 
equipment with which to equip trucks: plow blades, special 
mounting for the plows, rotating brushes, automatic salt spreaders 
and great quantities of BaIt and sand are needed. The snow e-
quipment i. manned in most cases by transit trainmen, who have 
completed their runs and who volunteer for snow duty, at time and 
one-halt pay. Ironically when this money consmning operation 
achieves its end, the street is again opened for hoards of auto-
mobiles which continue to impede mass transit vehicles. 
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Special services such as these should not be charged to 
pperating expense, and yet it is difficult to do otherwise. The 
~ost of these services, while they are conslderable, does not 
~ppear in transit accounts as taxes. In reviewing the tax picture 
~n transit this fact must be emphasized to reach a reasonable con-
plusion of the burden imposed on the industry. 
In 1953, tor example, the industry paid 6.43 per cent of 
~he operating revenue in taxes. The dollar and cents figure tor 
~ll taxes totaled over ninety-seven million dollars. ot this 
Wmount more than 61 per oent was paid to looal government: mu-
~icipa1, state, and county. 
TABLE VIII*' 
TRANSIT TAXES IN 1953 
Amount 
F'edel"al Taxes (total) $37 ,4J~5, 000 
Income Taxes 18,862,000 
Other Federal 
Taxes 18,$83,000 
State, County and 
Local Taxes 59,903,000 
Total Taxes $97,348,000 
*' Transit Elli ~, 1954. 
Per cent 
Distribution 
38 .47% 
19.38 
19.09 
61.53 
100.00 10 
r 
The impact or taxati0n on a small transit company is 
startingl:; told below. 
The burden which taxes in various £orms impose on 
tho local transit company was pOinted up in a recant edi-
torial in the "Baton Rouge state Timesu • 
The newspaper stated that the profit earned by the 
local company in 1953 was "quite small'·. amounting to 
~\2, 634. 
Another section of the report, the editorial con-
tinued, showed that total taxes pa.id by the Baton Rouge 
Transit Company to City, parish, state, and rederal 
governments amounted to $79,735 for the year. This burden 
is not placed on publicly owned enterprises. This in 
itself offers the opportunity ror an intriguing eompari~n. 
The company makes less than $3,000 profit for the year 
yet it pays almost $80,000 in taxea. 
This tax bill was divided as follows: the city and 
parish received $22,444; the state $37,850; and the total 
tax btll, $1+1+.359 went for taxes on gasoline and 011 used 
by company vehicles during the year. or this amount the 
state received the 110n's share of $34,165. 
In viewing the report in general it is quite obvious 
that the translt business is not among the best in Baton 
Rouge. It Is clearly seen that the national trend In 
transit operations is running true to form here In Baton 
Rouge •••• 
A $2,6~+ profit for a year's operation with an in- 5 
vestment the size of the bus company's is not inspiring. 
M.AINTJU~ANCF. o Ii' EQUIPMENT 
Maintenance of transit equipment and facilities 18 an-
ther of the princIpal costs of transit operations. The erficien-
y with which operating personnel can perform their duties in 
9, 1954. 
5 Edltorial, paasenser Transport, II, No. 47, March 
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providing service to the urban populace is directly affected. by 
the manner in which maintenance is performed. 
Maintenance embraces efforts to provide safe, depend-
able, and clean vehicles for the conveyance of riders. In additl01 
the manner in which theee duties are performed relates directly to 
the phyeieal value of the property, since poor maintenance de-
erea.es value and tends to increase other costs, as an increase in 
claims due to injury resulting from more frequent vehicle failures 
A .ell rounded program of maintenanoe on the other hand tends to 
maintain the value of investment in transit physical property. 
The necessity of maintaining equipment adeqUately is 
also seen from the aspect of attaining maximum use trom the vehi-
cle to preclude increase in capital structure, which becomes nece.-
sary when new equipment must be purchased betore existing e-
quipment has been fUlly depreCiated. 
A major portion of maintenance expense is labor cost. 
The number of men needed to clean vellicles £or passenGer service, 
to make light inspections whioll include minor repairs, and to 
overhaul equipment is an important faotor. The cost or re-
placement parts and materials, while considerable, i~ of lesser 
import than the man hours expended in maintenance. This follows 
from the great dichotomy between a production 3hop and a repair 
shop. Production duties can be broken down into the simple ele-
ments and jobs assigned on the easier level. Maintenance ot 
!, () Lj..J 
equipment, however" requires ekU.led er~ployees who are fully aware 
of the components of the vehiC'les and who are competent to diag-
nose malfunctions and make repall:'s. 
The cost of a maintenl?nce department ve.riea from proper-
ty to p.roperty, and ranges from 5 to 25 per cent of Cross revenue. 
Maintenance costs will also fluctuate in an.y given property li'.c.en 
new equipment is pur·chased. In the normal use ot: vehicles mainte-
nance coats are extremely low in the early life of the equipment; 
and increase as the useful lite i8 extended. Expenditures for 
maintenance can be planned and fluctuations leveled within reS50n-
able 11m1 ts when eq1.1ipment purchases have been scheduled', More 
concisely stated, the cost of maintenance of a given series of 
buses is increased in direot relation to the age of the equipment, 
but a maintenance budget without steep aberations C~l be projected 
when fleet purchases are properly scheduled. 
PUEL AND POWER 
Power and fuel coata constitute the third of the three 
major transit costs, taxes excluded. The electric power that pro-
pels mass transit vehicles continues to represent e sizeable ex-
penditure by transit managements. Formerly electricity was almoat 
the exclusive mover of mass transportation, and absorbed a greater 
proportion of revenues than today, when II10S t transit vehicles are 
B:l.ltomotive. Power then, as now, wes elther genflrated by the 
~raction company, purchased, or both. 
To emphasise the continuing high cost ot power and also 
~o indicate the lessened usage by transit The American Transit 
~ssoeiation statistics on power are presented below. 
TABLE IX~· 42 
.' 
sounCE Arm DISTRIBUTIOi\ Of' ELECTRICAL ENERGY 
cor~SUMED BY TUE TRANSI'!' INDUSTRY OF THB 
maTED STATES A~W COST OF' PURCHASED POWER 
1920-1953 
Kilowatt Hours (In Millions) Cost 
Calen- Total Consumption of 
dar Rapid Sur- Trolley Gener- Purchas-Purchased 
Year Transit face Coach Total ated ed Power 
Railway 
1920 1,256 8,066 ... 9,322 tt,313 5,009 :~;56, 101, 000 1921 1,278 7,863 
-
9,141 ,031 5,110 57,232,000 
1922 i:a~ 7,887 - 9,201 3,eft6 5,695 63,215,000 19& 7,894 - 9,~10 3, 1 5,869 63,972,000 19 1,488 7,951 
- 9, ~9 3,356 6,083 6.5,6~,000 1925 1,548 7,995 
-
9,$ 3 3,237 6,306 66,8 ,000 
1926 1.~2 8,021 - 9,613 3,108 6,~0~ 68,303,000 192~ 1, 1 7'K49 - 9,390 2,976 6, 1 ~,822,162 192 l'A 0 , 10 (a) 9,170 2,935 6,235 ,221,000 1929 1, 24 7,121 (a) 8,945 2,863 6,082 62,645,000 
1930 1,8~2 6,816 18 8,676 2,770 5'406 60,241,000 1931 1,7 5 6,283 24- 8,092 2,621 ~, 71 55,80~,000 1932 1,715 5,629 29 7,373 2,433 t+,~o gO,38 ,000 19~ 1,736 5,273 ~r 7,041 2,377 4, 4 7,106,000 19 1,~93 $,265 7,105 2,353 tt,753 47,055,000 1935 1, 52 5,096 7,009 2,309 ,~OO 46,060,000 1936 1,934 g,OB7 87 7,108 2,271 
tt:a
3i 46,1 .. 35,000 1937 1,970 ,894 16l.J, 7,028 2,197 45,750,000 
193e 1,921 h,399 234 g:g~ 2,114- )-1-,440 41,736,000 19~9 1,971 4,203 264 2,164 tt,274 39,321,000 19 0 1,977 4,050 307 6,m 2,255 ,079 37,114,000 1941 1,986 ~,808 ~51 6, 5 2,167 ~,978 3:';,40 ,000 1942 1,964 082 25 6,471 2,227 ,21+4 ,7,347,000 
191M 1.9~9 4:658 483 7,080 2,23~ tt:~i 1,698,000 19 1,9 ° 4,667 492 7,099 2,2.3 41,85),000 1945 1,9 6 t,~7 520 7,033 2,130 4,903 4.3,293,000 1946 1,964 ,3 0 568 6,912 2,077 4,835 42,258,000 
1947 2,003 4,255 63[; 6,896 2,093 4,803 li4·r2• OOO 1948 2,O~ 3,621 7.32 6,372 2,113 4,259 42, 62,000 1949 2,0 2,882 806 5,712 2,123 3,589 38, 54,000 
1950 2,000 2,410 841 5,251 2,070 3,181 34,291,000 
1951 1,970 2,010 846 4,826 1,870 2,956 32,~86,000 
1952 1,860 1,640 859 tt,3g9 1,770 2,,89 28, 08,000 1953 1,820 1,390 850 ,0 0 1,590 2, 70 28,000,000 (a) Included with Surface Railway. 
ito Prepared by the American Transit Association from 
data published in Transit Fact Books and presented to the author. 
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Total power consumed by transit has obviously declined; 
use in 1951 was only slightly over half of the 1920 consumption. 
The cost of the power used in 1951 was somewhat more expensive 
than earlier, but not significantly so. These figures on power 
consumption augment those on miles of route operated by type of 
transit vehicle in disclosing the changing vehicle use by the 
industry. 
While power consumption has declined in past years, the 
consumption of automotive fuels has risen. The prinCipal fuels 
used are gasoline and diesel oil, though liquified gases, such as 
propane and butane, are growing in importance. The properties of 
each produce specific problems and advantages which must be 
weighed in the light of local conditions. A detailed consideratio~ 
is unnecessary for the purposesof this endeavor. 
Transit today must scrutinize all costs to retain the 
essential, eliminate the unnecessary, and to obtain maximum result 
for dollars expended. Costs haveincreased dollarwise and also in 
relation to the total income of the transit industry. 
The continued viability of privately owned transits, in 
the opinion of the author, is dependent upon a decline in costs or 
a great increase in the riding habit to offset the continuing cost 
increase. It seems inevitable that private transit companies must 
succumb in increaSing numbers if costs continue to soar and riders 
continue to disappear. 
CHAPTER V 
TODAY AND TOMORROW 
IMPORTANCE OF MASS TRANSPORTATION 
In the complex, far-flung urban community of today the 
means of transportation are vital. The distances traversed by 
urbanities for pleasure alone would stagger the imagination of our 
forefathers. Needless to point out, cessation of all means of 
local transit would quickly bring metropolitan life to a near stop. 
The ability to move quickly from place to place has become so 
common it is difficult to conjure a mental picture of what a me-
tropolis would be without transportation. 
In this automotive age the prime mover of people 1s the 
family car. Throngs of automobiles are seen on city streets at 
almost hour. Traffic in the critical hours in which most 
people go to and from work is an orgy, mistakenly called "rush 
hour". In the midst of this congestion transit vehicles carry 
fifteen billion passengers a year, a numerous minority. 
ESSEr~TIAL NATURE 
If the important nature of urban mass transit is not 
demonstrated by the SUbstantial number of people that has con-
tinued to ride, we need only look to the pages of our newspapers 
44 
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when fare increases are requested. 
Urban mass transportation is an essential public utility 
for some it is the only means of conveyance; to others it is im-
portant for use when the family car is disabled, or driving con-
ditions are hazardous. 
The service of mass transit today is the skeleton of 
what it was. It has been reduced as profits diminished due to de-
creased riding, yet it cannot be superseded and driven into ob-
livion in our large cities; it is too vital to public welfare. 
The street which bore horse and buggies cannot carry the volume of 
automobile traffic that would be needed to transport everyone to 
and from work. Transit companies throughout the country are 
approaching the red ledger side of their account books. 
Since mass transit cannot be completely replaced, what 
can be done? In our free enterprise system the ordinary business 
makes profit or it disappears. Investors do not offer funds 
needed to purchase equipment or to rejuvenate a laggingbuslness, 
unless a reasonable interest will be gained. Speculators do not 
proffer monies to an industry which earlier has defaulted on obli-
gations, which shows littler or no return on current investment, 
and which evidences little prospect of improved fortune tomorrow. 
SOME CONCLUSIONS 
It seems obvious to the author, that if the present 
trend of rising costs and declining passenger volume continue in 
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transit, municipalities can retain mass transportation only 
through municipal ownership. 
The review of the history of the transit industry and 
consideration of its present plight is proof that a policy of 
expediency by the communities served by transit and by the manage-
ment of the oompany w111 not solve this problem. Ephemeral 
thinking did nothing to dispel the governing foroes of competition. 
and such thinking cannot enable transit to survive. 
Private capital in certainty will not, and should not, 
be expected to finance a necessary public service without a 
reasonable return on the investment. If the decline in riding and 
the rise in costs continues it is certain that even the most 
stable companies will be compelled to raise fares beyond the point 
which will permit riding at even todayts low volume. 
The experience of fare increases in recent years indi-
cates that each increase induces more riders to forsake transit 
for the private automobile. This has been a vicious cycle; 
increased fares have resulted 1n passengers losses which in time 
requires another fare increase. Who is to demand that private 
capi tal furnish service below cost? Who can demand it? Yet how 
can the millions of transit riders, though a minority, be served? 
The riders require service. 
Study of the writings of many transit executives through~ 
out the country would seem to indicate that they have resigned 
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themselves to the tates. Even men who tight a daily battle against 
taxes, rising costs, automobile oongestion, and declining riding 
seem to see little hope tor mass transit. Perhaps a note ot 
futillty creeps into their thinking. Powell O. Groner, president 
of Kansas 01ty Public Servlce, in reply to a question about the 
future of mass transit expresses the subjeot clearly enought. 
But if you ask my opinion as to the future ot private 
capital in the transit industry, I would have to be 
realistic enough to state that I think it has very 
'.:,little future. When the bell t brains, energy. and 
ingenuIty are unable to produce, on an overall basis, 
the safest ot all investments, a government bond, then 
how long ~an we expect private additional funds? 1 
It the present trend ot less riding, higher costs, and 
greater congestion continues to dominate the horizon ot the transi1 
industry, the 8ervice ot these utilities can be oontinued only 
through 8ubsldatlon ot private companies or public ownership. 
O~ these two possible means of insuring to the urban 
populace an adequate transit system let us oonsider first the 
method ot subsidation.2 The subeidation of private transit can be 
accomplished indIrectly or dIrectly. An indireot subsidy would 
oonsist of reduction or removal ot taxea and stipulated services 
1 !!!! TransEortation, Vol. 47, No.1, 31. 
a Webste.r'. Collegiate Diotionary, 5th Edition, G & 0 
Merriam CO~, Springfield, Mass. Subsidation, n. rrom subsidize, 
v.t. to furnish with & ~ubsidy ~s a. to purchase the assistance or, 
by the payment ot a subsidy, b. to aid or promote, as a prIvate 
enterprise with public money. 
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imposed by the munioipality or state. A direot subsidy would be 
the outright grant ot publio funds to the transit company. 
Subsidies whether direot or indireot are subjeot to muoh 
abuse, but even when abuse Is absent we are faced with use of 
publio funds to meet private operatIng expenses Which normally 
would preclude payment of dividends on invested capItal. An 
example of' abuse of subsidation oocurred in the Kansas City Publio 
Servioe Oompany_ 
Last year Kansas City Publio Servioe received a subsidy ot 
nearly $100,000 whioh was used to pay the salaries of the 
street railway commissioner and members of his staft, the 
cost 01" removal ot snow and ioe and sanding and clndering 
streets" repair ot pavement between traoks and the oost ot 
maintaining eleotric lights at oertain intersection. 
But last month, ween the subsidy oame up tor renewal. 
the city council voted six to thr~e not to grant &ny 
addItional subsidies to the company. (Although lome of 
'he subsidy was later reatoredJ 
~e action was taken at a meeting at which oouncil 
members critioized the bDard of directors ot the transit 
company tor its reoent action in deolaring a dividend to 
preferred stookholders while the company was acoepting a 
subsidy from the city. 
-I do not see how this counoil," said one oounoilman, 
"can vote any additIonal subsidy to the company only to 
have the direotors sometime this year give the money to 
the stookholders in dIvidends." 
"Last year I voted with the others for a subsidy to 
help the oompany. About $100,000 of the oompany's obliga-
tions were taken over by the c1ty. And what do the 
directors do? They voted a $1 dividend before the end of 
the year to the preferred stockholders, whioh amounted to 
$108,000. 3 
:; Editorial,' "The Heart of the Matter". Mass 
-Transportation, February, 1952. 
r 
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Public subsidy which permits a private corporation to 
lieclare a dividend is surely a grave abuse. These funds which are 
~athered from the public to meet public needs should not become 
the source of profit for a few. 
Public ownership of transit is itself subsidation of 
transportation service, since public ownership removes some tax 
burdens, and indeed these properties are sometimes reCipients of 
~lrect grants. 
The publicly owned transit property, however, continues 
to provide essential public service, without the odium of making 
profit for private enterprise through subsidation. It is true that 
public transit seeks funds by loatlng bond issues, which carry an 
interest rate. Stock holders in a private transit property re-
ceive "interest" as dividends. Henoe, the jistlnctlon drawn is 
somewhat fine, yet we believe morally sound: if subsidy is made to 
public transit it benefits all the people. Bond holders of 
transit securities, private or publio, of course have no stake in 
ownership of the property, as do stockholders in private corpo-
rations. 
While public ownership is offered by some individuals as 
a cure for transit ills, it is decried by others as socialism. 
Points of view relative to public ownership are many and diverse. 
If one accepts the essential nature of the industry and realizes 
its present plight, one must conclude that private ownership 
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~annot continue to fulfill the transit function if present con-
11 tions persist. Public ownership is not a panacea. to solve all 
problems. But it is more justifiable than subsidy of private 
~nterests. If a needed function cannot be equitably obtained by 
~he public under private enterprise, then it must be assumed by 
~overnment. Surely this is not socialism for socialism's sake, 
but government's acceptance of its role in SOCiety. 
Over the years since World War I the cumulating pressure. 
described above have driven a number of municipalities to acquire 
transit properties. Analysis of the results of muniCipal owner-
ship does not reveal lower fares, nor does it necessarily mean 
that better service is provided. It does mean, however, that mass 
transit is available and will continue to serve the transportation 
Ineeds of the community. without subsidizing private industry from 
tpublic funds. The muniCipally owned transit system has still 
another advantage not possessed by a subsidized private company. 
The former has rul inJividual political entity, or Is a separate 
department of the municipal government, and Is intimately associ-
ated with civic projects for betterment, which is difficult if not 
impossible for private transit. 
By the end of 1952 there were forty publically owned 
transit systems, and three partially owned systems in the United 
States. They range from Pass-a-Grille Beach, Florida, with a 
population of 1,000 people to New York City with about eight 
~ fU,q-rR. .. 
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~111on people. 
In Table X a summary ot the Pub11cly OWner Trans1t 
ompanies 1n the United States 1s presented. Table XI presents a 
1rt of the Publioly Owned Systems or Canada. 
I . 
r 
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TABLE X* 
PUBLICLY-OWNED TRANSIT SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED SfllATES 
Citx 
Over 1,000.000 Pop'n 
New York, N. Y. 
Chioago, Ill. 
Detroit, Mich. 
ooo,~o .. 1.000,000 
Cleveland, Ohio 
Boston, Mass. 
San Franoisco, Cal. 
250,QOO - 500,000 
Seattle, Wash. 
100.000 - 250.000 
IPhoenix, Ariz. 
50.000 .. 100.000 
~t. Petersburg, Fla, 
~anta Monioa, Oal. 
~pringfield, Mo. 
~an Angelo, Tex. 
BS.OOO .. 50.000 
~clid, Ohio 
M on:roe , La. 
A 1exandria, La. 
Daytona Beach, Fla. 
Population 
1950 
7,891,957 
3,620,962 
1,849,568 
914,808 
801,444. 
775,357 
4.67,591 
106,818 
96,738 
71,595 
66,731 
52,093 
41,396 
38,572 
34,913 
30,187 
Companx 
New York City Transit Syst81 
Chioago Transit Authority 
City of Detroit, Dept. of 
St. Rys. 
Cleveland Transit System 
Metropolitan Trans1t 
Authority 
Municipal Ry. of San 
Frano1sco 
Seattle Trans1t System 
Phoenix fransportation 
System 
Mun1cipal Transit System 
Santa Monica Munic1pal 
Bus Line 
City Ut11ities of Springt!el 
City of San Angelo Bus Linea 
City,of Eucl!d, Municipal 
Bus Lines 
City ot Monro~Munielpal 
Bua Service 
Municipal Bua Line 
Daytona Beach Municipal Bus 
r 
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'lIABLE X 
PUBLICLY.OWNED TRANSIT SYSTEMS IN 'rim UNITED STATES 
Continued 
City 
Shaker Heights, Ohio 
Vallejo, Cal. 
110.000 .. 25.000 
Janesville, Wis. 
~shtabula, Ohio 
Paaadena~ Tex. 
f,rorranc8, Cal. 
Pekin, Ill. 
Montebello, Cal. 
IStaunton, Va. 
~oral Gables, Fla. 
pulver CIty, Cal. 
Plattsburs,- N. Y. 
lVentura, Cal. 
tlaple lieights, Ohio 
Greenfield, Mass. 
Gardena, Cal. 
Winch •• ter, Va. 
Ooea.nside, Cal. 
waynesboro, Va. 
Lea s than 10 *_000 
Radford, Va. 
Population 
1950 C,omPany 
28,222 CIty ot Shaker Heights, Dept. 
of Transpi'h 
26,038 CIt,- of Vallejo Bus I .. l:O.es 
24,829 
23,696 
22,483 
22,241 
21,858 
21,735 
19,927 
19,83'7 
19,720 
17,'725 
16,534 
15,586 
15,075 
14,405 
13,841 
12,881 
12,337 
9,026 
City ot Janesville, 
(name not avaIl.) 
City ot Ashtabllla, Div. ot 
Transpn. 
City of. Pasadena~ (name not 
avail.) 
Torranoe Munio1pal Bus LInes 
City of Pekin Munioipal Bus 
Division 
Montebello Municipal Bus Lima 
Staunton Transit Service 
City ot Coral Gables Mun101pl 
Bus Sys. 
Culver City ot Munioipal BUB 
Lines 
City of Plattsburg, (name not 
avail.) 
Citizens Transit Lines 
Maple Heights Munioipal Bus 
Line 
Greenfield-Montague Tranapn. 
Area (Owned jointly with 
City ot Montague) 
Gardena Munioipal Bus Line 
Winchester City Transit Lines 
City ot Oceanside Transpn. Sys. 
City ot Waynesboro. (name not 
avail. ) 
City of Radtord, Dept. of 
Public Utilities 
TABLE X 
PUBLICLY.OWNED TRANSIT SYSTEtffi IN THE UNITED STATES 
Continued 
Montague, Ma8s. 
Horth Olmsted, Ohio 
Cumberland, Ky. 
Pass-a-Grille Beaoh 
Fla. 
Population 
1950 
7,812 
6,574 
4,249 
1,000 
f , 
Company 
Greenfield-Montague Transpn. 
Area (Owned jointlr with 
City of Greenfield) 
North Olmsted Municipal 
Coach Line 
Cumberland Transit Go. 
Pass-a-Grille Beach Bus 
Lines 
*Prepared by the American Transit Association and pre-
sented to the Author. It should be noted that this list ot 
publicly owned transit systems is reasonably complete althou~~ one 
or two systems may have escaped the attention ot the Amerioan 
Transit Association at the time the table was prepared. 
r 
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TABLE XI* 
PUBLICLY OVmED LOCAL THANSIT SYSTEMS IN CANADA 
00 000-250 000 
ttawa, Ont. 
;dmonton, Alta. 
algary, Alta. 
indsor, Ont. 
ark Twp., Ont. 
eston Twp., Ont. 
egina., Sask. 
askatoon, Sask. 
t. 
shawa, Ont. 
antrord, Ont. 
Ont. 
Ont. 
uelph, Ont. 
Population 
1951 Prell 
1,002,713 
670,945 
198,773 
Company 
Montreal Transportation 
Commission ~ 
Toronto Transportation 
Coooniasion (Subs.) Gray 
Coach Lines, Ltd. 
Ottawa Transportation 
Commission 
158,709 Edmonton Transit System 
126,631 Calgary Transit System 
119,550 Sandwich" Windsor & 
Amherstburg Ry. Co. 
100,867) (a)York Twp. & Town of 
8,646) 
Weston Rys. 
74,984 (London & Port Stanley Ry. (London Street Railway Co. 
69,928 Regina Transit System 
52,732 Saskatoon Transit System 
44,797 Public Utilities Comm. or 
Kltchener 
41,359 {b)The Oshawa Railway Co. 
36,555 Public Utilities Comm, or 
Brantford 
34,783 Ft. William Transit 
30,741 Public Utilities Comm. ot 
Port Arthur 
27,246 Guelph Transportation 
Commission 
r 
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TABLE XI 
PUBLICLY OWNED LOCAL THANSIT SYST.i;;MS IN CANADA 
Continued 
City 
10,000 .... 25,000 
Lethbridge, Alta. 
West Vancouver# B.C. 
Less Than 10,000 
Nelson, B.C. 
North Yonge, On't. 
Population 
1951 iTe1. 
22,811 
13,850 
6,634 
.... 
C°mRany 
Lethbridge Transit System 
W. Vancouver Municipal Transp'J 
Corporation of the City of 
Nelson 
(a)North Yonga Bus 
*Prepared by The American Transit Assooiation and 
~resented to the author. 
r 
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To exemplify the trends in transit which we have 
considered thus far, we shall consider now the story of the 
development of the Chlcai~o Transi t Au thori ty, a municipal corpo-
I 
ration for public ownership and operation of transit in the 
~atropolitan area of Cook County. 
r 
CHAPTER VI 
CASE STUDY: THE CHICAGO TRANSIT AUTHORITY 
On October 1. 1947 the two principal local transit 
systems, the Chicago Surface Lines and the Chicago Rapid Transit 
Company, surrendered their properties in sale to the Chicago 
Transit Authority. The Authority form of public owners:J.ip was 
authorized by the Chicago City Council, the Illinois legislature. 
and accepted by the people of the metropolitan area. The 
Authority succeeded two competitors who had been in receivership 
for years. 
Mass transit in Chicago is not a new thing. In fact it 
has existed in Chicago for over one hundred years. To better 
understand the necessity of creating a publicly owned transit 
system in Chicago, let us review some of the high points in this 
long history of Chicago Transit. 
In May, 1853 the first organized transit made its 
appearance. "Franklin Parmalee started the 1'irst regular omnibus 
se~vlce with five ~r six busses. nI The first efforts of Mr. 
Parmalee to provide transportation were not formalized in relation 
1 "Your Vehicles", 1!!!. Union Leader, March 29, 1952, 18 
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to the looal governmental authorities. However. on August 16, 
1858 an ordinanoe was passed whioh granted him the right to con-
struct horse railways, and to operate them tor twenty-five years, 
and after until suoh time as the cIty purchased. them. 
In a short peri~d several oompanies were organized to 
build and operate street railways, among these were North Chicago 
City Railway Company (North side), the Chicago 0Ity Railway 
Company, and the Ohicago West Division Railway Oompany_ The early 
franohises all were effeotive tor twenty-tive year •• 
It is interesting to note that in February, 1865 the 
Illinois legislature passed an aot which extended the corporate 
lite ot the above oompanies trom twenty-tive to ninety-nine years. 
and which provided further, that the rate ot tare was subject to 
review by the General Assembly. A battle developed between the 
~ocal government and the state legislature ooncerning the power to 
grant transit franchises whioh was finally resolved by a tederal 
~ourt deei8ion.2 The immediate result of the oonflict was pass-
lage ot the aot over the governor's veto. This action roused the 
weople of the state, and eventually their agitation resulted in 
~weeplng changes 1n the state constitution and statutory law 
2 Blair v. Chioago, 201 U.S. 400, the "ninety-nine" year 
oaS8 was decided on Ma.rch 12, 1906. The opinion of the high court 
announced that the Aot of February 6, 1865 (to extend the franchise 
to nlnety.nine years) confirmed the contrac t between the prinoi-
pals, but did not have the effect of extending the terms of the 
ordinance. 
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relating to the street railway provisions. 
~'hroughout the early period of Chicago transit, regu-
lation of the companies was accomplished by fl.1eans of special ordi-
nances which granted the right to install, maintain, and operate 
transpor~ation facilities. Provisions governing service and rates 
of fare were embodied in the ordinances. The attempt to regulate 
in this manner fostered a network of surface transportation that 
overlapped and bred competition between lines closely paralleling 
one another. The development of Chicago transit in the early 
~eriod of ordinance control was unorganized, haphazard, and corrupt. 
~peculators and politicians abounded in the growing days of Chicago, 
~nd the transportation industry was fertile ground for these ac-
~ivities. Since granting the right to operate in city streets 
~as within the dominion of the City Council, the renewal of the 
~ranchise frequently proved the occasion for increased exactions 
~rom the industry. 
SETTLEMENT ORDINANCES 
In the latter years of the period of city control, however, 
important steps were taken toward organizing a compre-
hensive transit system. The city council enacted in 1907 
a series of ordinances, known as the Chicago traction away 
from the chaos that had been ~roduced by the indiscrimate 
granting of franchise rlghts. 3 
3 Chicago Transit Authority, Local Transit in Chlcaso, 
eport of Chicago Transit Authority, November; 1951, 1.-
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The settlement ordinances were the culmination of the 
extreme displeasure of the people of Chicago, the municipal govern 
ment, and of the transit companies, Service offered by the 
companies was naturally swayed by the uncertainty of franchise 
renewal, since refunding of capitalization became practically 
impossible when negotiations faltered. This lack of financial 
backing led to steadily deteriorating equipment. 
The effect of the settlement ordinances was creation of 
two financially strong systems. Many lesser companies were 
whoo1y owned by one or other, and perpetuated by reason of 
franchise advantage, and sometimes for apparent financial purposes 
The two street railways were the Chicago Railways on the North and 
West sides of the City, and the Chicago City Railway, et aI, on 
the South side. The provisions of the settlement ordinances were 
numerous. To cite a few provisos; reconstruction of the proper-
ties, extension of the systems, authorization for overhead trolley 
wire, through route for certain lines,j and ultimate purchase by 
the city for fIfty million dollars (twenty-one million dollars 
for Chicago City RaIlway, and twenty-nIne million dollars for 
Chicago Railways Company). More important than these was the 
protection offered the companies from competition from newly 
formed companies, since the City Council prohibited granting of 
franchises to any other company to operate on specified streets 
for a period of twenty years. 
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Section twenty-four of the ordinance has special inter-
est to many since it specifies the major imposition on the 
company. 
Section 24 provides for an amlUal accounting and 
settlement between the company and the clty~ the pay-
ment of an intereat return of 5 per cent on the capital 
investment, and the division of the net receipts--55 
per cent to the c1ty and 45 per cent to the company. It 
also provides that the city may commute its share of the 
net receipts into an equivalent reduotion of tares and 
that~ subject to the action at the City Council, the 
payments made by the company to the oity shall be kept 
and used :for the purpose of the purchase and oonstruotion 
of street railways by the city. 4 
According to Weber in his outline (p.72), the settlement 
ordinances climaxed five years at negotiation. To ef:fectuate the 
provIsions of the ordinances the Board 01' Supervising Engineers 
was establIshed which included a representative o-r the city. 
Wh11ethe strengthenIn,g o-r the two major surface lines 
prooeeded atter 1907. the service offered proved up~atisfactory on 
the whole. It was not possible for a passenger to ride on one oar 
over one route for any considerable distance, since the through 
routing of ca.rs 01' the coopera.ting linea was not extensive. To 
correct this situation the City CouncIl passed a Unification 
Ordinance on November 13, 1913 which provided that operations 
should produce "the same and with like effect as though all the 
~up:race street rallway oompanies in the City of Chicago were owned 
" Weber. ~ Outline History 9.!. Chicago, Traction, 68. 
and operated by one company". This ordinance also required the 
elimination of scheduled switchbacks in the downtown area and the 
inaU~3uration of a universal transfer. 
UNIFICATION 
Unified operation of the street railways began on 
February 1, 1914. Just one month prior to the commencement of 
unified operation of a new era dawned for local transit in Illinoil 
and the second major period of local transit in Chicago began. fin 
January 1. 1914 the Public Utilities Commission of Illinois 
assumed its duties.5 
The Chicago Surl'ace Lines. a 8 the cooperating lines came 
to be called, were governed by theUnitication Ordinance until 
1927. However, questions of tares, service, capitalization etc. 
were also reviewed by the Commerce Commission. The division of 
net receipts between company and city established by the 
Settlement Ordinances of 1908 was restated and provision for 
division of monies among the companies was made. 
section II, paragraph 7. section 2. Provides for division 
of residue receipts. For the first two years, 59 per cent 
to the Chicago Rai1waya Company and 41 per cent to the 
other three companies, 
5 The commission was established on June 30, 1913 when 
the Illinois Legislature enacted thePublic utilities Regulation 
Act. 
6 The other companies were the Chicago City Railway 
Company; the Southern Street Railway Company and the Calumet and 
South Chicago Railway Company. 
During the remainder of the term 60 per cent to the Chicago 
Railways C~mpany and L~o per cent to the other three 
companies. 
During thR early years of the grant the companies enjoye, 
a pe~iod of financial success. Riding was high, automobiles were 
not a serious competitor, and the only other major transportation 
was offered by the Rapid Transit Company. In 1922, about 80 per 
cent, or 76),000,000 revenue passengers, of the total traffic of 
the Aurface and elevated companies were transported by the Surface 
Lines. The weakening of the status of the Surface Lines and of 
the Rapid Transit after 1922 resulted from the inauguration of 
competing bus lines which paralleled existing l1nes. The ces-
sation of World War I also permitted the automobile industry to 
return to production for the civilian market, where they soon gave 
promise of competing for the transportatIon means of people. 
Another factor of import to note was the beginning of 
the decentralization of the city. The population in the 1920's 
began to expand from the centralbusinass district. The vacated 
areas, adjacent to the Loop, have produced the profitable 'short-
hau1t traffic. With the trend away from town mass transit either 
carried the shifted riders appreciably greater distances or lost 
them entirely. 
7 Weber,!!! Outline HIstory .2! Chicago Traction, 102. 
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Tr~oughout the period of these great ohanges, i.e., the 
rise of auto competition and deoentralization, costs were rising 
a.nd trai'i~lc oongestion was increasing drastically. The extent to 
whioh competition affected the Surfaoe Lines is ind1eated below in 
the steady dealine in net income before taxea, interest, nnd 
dividends after 1929. 
Year 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1943 
1944 
Avera.ge 
Average 
Average 
Average 
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TABLE XIIJ,} 
RESULTS OF SIDlFACE LINES OPERATIONS 
1925 - 1944 
Total Expenses Net Income 
Including De- Available For 
preciation, Interest on 
General Taxes Debt, Federal 
Revenue and Cit,. Taxes and 
Passengers Total Income Compensation Dlvl.dends 
842,201 $58,735,881 $48,880,557 $ 9,905,324 
876.250 61,202,272 50,884,420 10,317,852 
882,459 61,628,755 51,392,762 10,235,993 
892,815 62,396,684 52,086,824 10,309,860 
897,564 62,968,270 51,941,556 11,026,714 
812,081 56,946,318 48,538,792 8,407,526 
732,096 51,228,027 42,895,144 8.332,883 
633,827 44,441,767 37,711,276. 6,731,49l 
651,603 45,480,311 37,783,557 7,696,754 
677,533 47,349,980 40,138,963 7,211,017 
672,147 46,597,770 40,414,721 6,,183,049 
720,302, 49,246,690 41,950,167 7,296,523 
721"tJ.1)() 49.278,676 44,704,173 '4:,7~i503 
676,259 46,113,576 43,083,902 3,029,674 
679,141 46,190,414 43,362,424 2,827,99J 
680,263 46,704,089 43,,423,000 3,281,0£9 
~/13,312 48,316,198 45,970,791 2,345,407 
774,730 58,291,645 53,680,648 4,610,997 
844,791 64,691,938 59,091,208 5,600,,730 
884,1"104 66,771,559 61,316,930 5,454,629 
1925-1944. .. .. .. • • .. .. It .. .. • .. • .. • $6.768,950 
1930-1944. • .. .. • • .. .. .. • • .. .. .. • .. 5,572,21'7 
1935-1944. • • .. . .. • .. • • • .. .. .. • • 4,520,459 
1940 ... 1944. .. .. .. • • • • .. .. .. • • • • • 4,258,550 
* ChIcago Transit Authority Ordinance. Proceedings ror 
Reorganization No.63584 (ConsolIdated) and Proc •• dings on Reorgani 
zation or a Cooperation No72912 (Consolidated)"in the District 
Qq~~ ofuth! U.S. for the Northern District ot Ill. Eastern Div. 
", 
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Surface lines statist1.cs on thFJ total number of revenue 
riders show a steady increa.se throughout the 1920.8. Total rides 
increased from about 760,000,000 in 1920 to about 898,000,000 in 
1929. The data presented above relatine to income indicates a 
rather healthy enterprise. The reader should recall however, the 
proifislon o.f the unifioa.tion ordinanoe which permi ted a 5 per cent 
l~eturn on stipulated oapita.lization, and required division of the 
net fiGure atter taxes, 55 per oent to the city a.nd 45 per oent 
to the oompanies. 
Nevertheless the Chicago Surface Lines in 192~ at the end 
of the twenty year franohise granted by the unifioation ordinance 
was a relatively stable concern. Before prooeeding with the 
franchise difficulties of the Surface Lines after 1927, let us 
turn now to the development or the Rapid Transit Company. 
CHAPTER VII 
THE n ELEVATED ft 
ALLEY EL 
The elevated system which spreads like a ~erve plexus 
through Chicago furnishes traffic free transportation. The 
Highline. as it is known among transit people, had its beginning 
on the South Side. The South Side Rapid Transit began operating 
on June 6, 1892, over its private right of way in the alley betwee 
state street and Wabash Avenue, which accounted for its colloquial 
name 'Alley E1'. To trace the development of this segment of the 
elevated network, before proceeding with the inauguration of the 
rest of the system, the South Side Line was extended from 39th 
street to its present terminal at Jackson Park by May 1, 1893, 
just in time for the opening of the Columbian Exposition. The 
equipment used on the road consisted of coaches pulled by small 
steam engines until 1898, when electrical eqUipment began oper-
atins_ The Englewood, Normal Park, stock Yards and Kenwood 
branches were completed by 1908. 
,1hile the Jackson Park extension was being completed, 
work was also progressing on the Lake street Elevated Line. 
Operations commenced on November 6, 1893. The original western 
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terminal was Laramie Avenue, but subsequently the line was con-
structed through Austin and Oak Park. The Metropolitan west Side 
ElevE'.ted Railroad was the third elevated l1ne to emerge in Chicag0 4 
It bAgan operating on May 6, 1&95 f'rom Franklin street to 
Marshfield Avenue, and shortly after the western terminal was 
extended to Darner. Avenue. Work was also progressing on the Logan 
Square and Humboldt Park Branche3, The Garfiold Park Branch, by 
June of 1895, extended to Cicero Avenue. Early in 1896 work began 
on the Douglas Park Line, which stretched, initially to western 
Avenue. 
Wbile the construction and extension of the Metropolitan 
Branches progressed, plans were being laid for the 'El' loop, and 
for the Northside Elevated. The Loop structure was built at last 
in 1897 permitting the West Side and South Side passengers to 
transfer directly to the other service upon payment of another fare 
The three elevated companies operated over the Loop structure undel 
a joint leasing agreement until 1900 when it was purchased by the 
Northwestern Elevated Company. The use of theLoop was then govern 
ad by contract with the using companies. 
Service on the North Side Elevated finally began running 
as far as Wileon Avenue on May 31, 1900. The North Side Main Line 
Extension to Evanston was not completed until 1908, a year after 
the inauguration or service on the Ravenswood Branch. 
The present day network of the Rapid Transit is sub-
.t:An+:"f:l"~+-.hA AAmA IilQ .... na .... wni"'-h Avia+.An an,.",,+: 101':1. wn .. ", +: .... 0 .. "'. 
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began to be through routed on the North ... South hranch under the 
terms of the Unification ordinance. The major additions nre the 
cit;.! owned stato Street Subwa::l and tl-:eMilwaukee-Congress Subws.y. 
'l'he state street Subway was completed in 191",,3, and the Mi1v/aukee-
Congress Subway was opened in 1951. 
In the development period of Chicago Elevated Lines, 
materials and labor costs were not substantial, hence the compa-
nies prospered financially. There was no great difficulty in 
raising capital to purchase the private right of way and erecting 
the steel structure. Electric equipment was introduoed and after 
the turn of the century wood and steel cars began to make theIr 
appearance. The first all steel cars were introduced just prior 
to the beginning of World War I. 
Financially the companies remained prosperous unt!l the 
early 1920's when the competition of the automobile began to en-
croach. After the first blush o~ auto competition, and parallel 
motor bus routes, the profitableness of the companies began to 
decrease. About the time the deterioration began the formar 
distinct but cooperating companies were unified under tho title 
the Chicago Rapid Transit Company. It was organized under 
Illinois Law ~n 1924. 
There is no better way to d eplct the declining stnte ot 
the results of ope!'ation. The table below is taken f rom the 
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records of the District Court of the United states, Northern 
District of Illinois, Eastern Division, and expresses revenue 
passenger traffic, as well as income and expenses. 
~era~ 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1922 
19~$9 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1943 
1944 
Average 
" 
It 
" 
Revenue 
Pas s engex:,. 
216,046 
228,813 
226,212 
207,864 
1SO,7"'4 
182,955 
152,414 
126,990 
124,855 
127,277 
131,421 
149,876 
150,350 
144,559 
145,394 
149,205 
153,995 
163,754 
175,178 
193,270 
1925 1944 
-
1930 1944 
-
1935 1944 
--
1940 1944 
-
* TABLE XIII 
RESUVI'S OFI OPEF..ATION"S O}tl 
OHIOAGO RAPID TRANSIT 
(: oMPANY 1025 - 1944 
Total expenses 
including 
Depreciation. 
General 'l!axea, 
Rentals Paid 
Total and City 
Inc oM C,qmpensa t10n 
.19,281~a8S $15,848,792 
20,,420,660 16,837,182 
20,344,752 17,031,446 
20,264,252 17,104,076 
21,329,608 18,165,084 
19,857,417 17,601,239 
16,588,722 16,523,925 
13,491,019 13,324,046 
12,969,420 12,325,969 
13,060,997 13,052,480 
12,896,608 12,993,109 
13,603,829 1:3, 75rl ,461 
13,;651,657 14,322,320 
13,024,739 13,8?B,8?5 
13,094,213 13,990,050 
13,325,316 13,909,559 
13,790,304 14,270,915 
15,232,224 15,194,759 
16,767,956 16,214,028 
18,116,399 17,247,319 
* Ohicago Transit Authority Ordinance 
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lie t Inc ome 
Available for 
Interest on 
Debt, Federal 
Taxes and 
Dividends 
. . 
t !5,t433,096 
3,583,478 
3,313,306 
3,160,178 
3,1.64,524 
2,256,178 
1,084,797 
166,973 
843,451 
8,517 
(96,601) 
28,368 
(670,663) 
(855,136) 
(895,837) 
(584,242) 
(480,611) 
37,466 
553,999 
869,080 
$935,017 
136,384 
(209,415) 
79,124 
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The impact of the Great Depression. upon the operations 
of the Ra~~\id Trans! t caTl~nct he denied after viewing the above 
stati!:;tics. However-, nl;;t ir.cOlY:e ~jef'ore taxes, debt pa;}'1nent and 
dividends declined eVen prior to the crash. The resurgence of.' the 
economy in the late 1930's did not reflect itself in. the receipts 
of the company, at least not to a satisfactory degree. In 1955, 
1937. 1938, 1930, 1940, and 1941 total expenses aotually exoeeded 
total income. These years Were extremely d:U'ficul t for the 
compa.ny. It f'1USt be remembered that the cost or olHu"ating and 
maintaining Rn elevated mass transit system is enormous. The 
lJainting and repair of ndles of steel p;irders, replaoement c·f 
ties, and guard rails while expansive in materials is ~artioularly 
costly in man hours. As the finanoia1 condition deteriorated the 
Rapid Transit Company expe:cienoed gran.ter difficult in 11'leating 
l')ayroll cos ts • 
On June 28, 1932, reoeivers were appointed f'or the 
Rapid Transit Oompany by the United States District Oourt of the 
Northern Distriot of Il11~ois on petition of a creditor. Efforts 
were made to reorganize the company as an elevated system and also 
as part of a comprehensive transit system, but all failed until 
the purchase by the Chicago Transit Authority in 1947. 
To return to the results of' Rapid Transit operation 
briefly, the decline in elevated riders was temporarily halted by 
the effects of the war eeono~!1y, which stabilized wages and prices 
and removed automobiles from th<3 streets. IZeceipts rose wi th -;.:he 
increase 1n passengers, and by 19hI-J. net income berers debt 
se.r'd_ce, taxes, and dividends approached a million dollars. HOw<lve .... 
the average for the year!'i :'93:-) to 19114 showed a yearly loss of 
almost a. quarter million dollars. 
After the cessation of hostilities, wartime controls 
were graduallyralaxed, and the return of automobiles saw a 
return to the prewar d ec11ne in transl t. 
In cons1dering the decline of the fortunes of the Rapid 
Trans1t Company, it. should also be noted that the company was 
prevented from incress 1n3 i 1;13 fares, a nd ,affecting other economies 
such as closing stations which no longer met expenses of operatiol'll-
Ths Illinois Commerce Commission was refused all petitions for an 
equl table fare, and would not permi t the company to ellmins.'te 
~ 
lIghtly used service which sapped the remaining strength of the 
business. 
f 
CHAPTER VIII 
The changing pattern of lite in Chioago alluded to 
previouely brought pressure on the financial oondition of the 
major transit companies. ,"As the term of the Chioago f)urface 
Lines t franchise drew to a close it became apparent ths.t refinano-
ing to improve equipment and servioe was going to be impossible. 
This followed trom the refusal ot the munioipalgovernment to 
proffer K franchise that did not provide tor unification of the 
Rapid TI'ansi t and the Surfaoe Lines. 
FIRST STRAW TO FALL 
The result ot this development was the financial coll~ 
of the northside, Chicago Railways Company, which went into re-
oeivership on Deoember 15, 1926. The other lines oomposing the 
Surfaoe Lines rollowed shortly arter; being placed under reoeiver-
shIp on July 7, 1930. These companies were to oontinue in reo81". 
ership until September 30, 1947 when purohase by the Chicago 
Transit Authority was oonsumated. 
The actions of the Chicago City Council in 1927 regard-
ing unifioation of transit requires oloser sorutiny. At the time 
they seemed obstiIlate and unreasoning In their attitude. The 
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deoision to press for unified transit was not precipitous. F'rom 
our vantage point a quarter century later, We mi€')lt even conclude 
they were farsighted. The conclusio.n. to press 1'01' complete 
unification was only the last step in a chain ot attempts to 
achieve comprehensive tl·ansportatio:n. It follows logically from 
the creation of unified operation of Sl.u"l"ace lines in 1913. 
CITY COUHCIL uN UlHFICATION 
Some of the steps in the evolution are traced below. 
1916 .. January 31 ... Chicago Traction and Subway Comrnissio!l created 
by the City Council. Among other things, the Commission 
was required to n ••• invest:i.gate and report upon the prob-
lem of obtaining improved transportation facilities 1'01" the 
City of' Chioago through: 
(a) "The unified operation as Q single system of the 
existing surface and elev~ted railroads ••• " 
1918 ... August 14 ... The City Council passed on ordinance entitled: 
nAn ordinance Authorizing the Chica.go Local Transportation 
Company to Construct, Maintain an.d Operate a System of 
Looal TranBportat1on, including Street Railways and 
Elevated Ra1lroad •••• tt 
1921 - November 2 ... Legislation again proposed to grant a fran-
ehise·to the Chicago Local Transportatlor- Company - see 
1918. 
1922 .. March 3 ... Henry A. Blair, pI'esident of the Chicago Surt'aoe 
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Lines, submitted a plan to the City Counoil for coordinat-
ing Surface and Elevated traotion under Joint operation by 
the oity and the oompanies. 
1922 - March 3 • Ulysses S. Sohwartz, Chairman of the Oommittee an 
Local Transportation, proposed muniCipal ownership and 
operation ot the surtaee and elevated transportation 
systems. 
1922 .. lune 28 - COUDsel ot the Committee of Looal Transportation 
submitted a plan. uThis provided tor the aoquisition by 
the City ot the existing surtaco and elevated lines." 
1922 ... September .... "All Chicago Council" plan tor extension ot 
the surtace and elevated lines and for the construction ot 
subways. 
1923 - May 28 .... Kelke~ Report recommending consolidat1on ot sur-
tace line. and elevated railways. 
1923 .... July 2 ... Mayor Dever'. plan tor oonsolidation. 
1925 - February 13 ... 1925 Ordinance recommendation tor unified 
tract1_. 
1925 .... December 29 ... ReooDllD8naation ot Alderman J. M. Arvey tor 
unltied trans1t. 
1926 .... April 16 .... Busch plan tor oonsolldation at the Surtaoe 
Lines and the Elevated Lines. 
1927 - lanuarJ 10 - Lisman Plan. 
the toregoing w111 indicate aomewhat the prolonged 
pressure for a consolidation ot surtace and elevated transit 
which prompted the Ohicago City Council to retuse long term 
tranchise to the Surface Lines. 
!he etforts to achieve an acceptable agreement among 
the Surface Lines, Rapid Transit Company, and the CIty were many 
and prolonged. But tor one reason or another all attempts to 
reorganize the properties as a private company were truitless. 
POl" many years the Rapid Transit Lines were in desperate tinan~ 
.traits. !hey had not met interest or principal charges on 
.ecurities tor years, and in the latter years were having serious 
ditficulty in meetIng payrolls. While the Surtace Line. tared 
better. they, too. were in a weakened condition. Interest pay-
ment. on tiratmortgage bonds bad been met, with difficulty, but 
they defaulted over a prolonged period on juntor seourities. 
POl" about sixteen years earnings were insutticient to meet all 
tinancial charges. Consequently, the city was uncompensated tor 
use ot the aweeta. 
COSTS OF OPERATIONS 
From the statistics presented earlier we can obtain a 
relationship ot receipts to operating coats that i. most reveal-
ing. The increase ot operating costs has been signiticant. 
While the tare charged passengers remained oonstant during the 
1930's the proportion ot cost to income increased. fbia tenden-
oy ot operating oosts to absorb a greater portion ot income waa 
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temporarily 810 .. 8« during the period ot wartime controls (and in-
creased riding). but the trend was not signifioantly reversed. 
TABLE XIV 
ANALYSIS OF SURFACE OPERATIONS 
Expena.a aa (Rounded) Per 
Year fotal Income Total Expenaea Cent ot IncOJae 
1985 $58,786,881 "8,8aO,657 N 
1930 56,946,318 48,538,792 81 
19S5 46,597,770 40,414,720 8'1 
1940 46,704,089 '3,423,000 9a 
1941 49,316,198 45,970,791 95 
1942 58,291,645 53,680,648 92 
1943 64,691,938 59,091,208 91 
1944 66,771,569 61,316,930 93 
Obv1ousl)" the ever increasing proportion ot income de-
voted to operating eosta, When unaooompanied by • veJ!1 great rise 
in total income. pre.ag •• an approaohing oollapse. 
It i8 agaln worthy or note that throughout th1. period 
there .. ere tew purchase. ot new equipment. These were the pur-
chase ot a tew gas bu •••• , and enough modern street oars to equip 
Madison street. S.rvioe chargea on borrowed tund. to proylde a 
substantial replaoement ot antiquatedoquipment would have requir-
ed a .fare inorease. Without fare increAse tilis replaoement waa 
yearly farther from possibility. Ettorts to obtain this increase 
were repeatedly denied by the Illinois Commerce Commission. 
* The tigures on income and expens.. .ere obtained 
. trom Chicago Transit Authority Ordinance. 
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CHICAGO CARS 
As has frequently been avered, the rise in costs of 
trans1t operat1on has been acoompan1ed by an extraord1nary in-
crease in automobile use. Presented below are statistios on 
automobile registration 1n the City ot Chioago. In perusing 
these ~igures it is •••• ntia1 to bear in mind that many people 
traverse the oity in automobiles register.d in .~roundlng oommu-
nities. The suburban areas, wherein many Chicago workers reside, 
have been growing in populaoe at a muoh taster rat. than the 
urban area. 
'!A.6LE XV 
MOTOR VEHICLES LICENSED BY THE CITY OF OHICAGO 
MAY 1, 1919 lI6 DECEMBER 31, 1951 
Passenger Autos Oyer 
Date 15 BP or les8 35 liP 
5/1/1912 to 4/30/13 14,593 
• 13 • 14 19.485 
• 14 u 15 24,034 
u 15 n 16 32,441 
"16 • 17 45,565 
• 17 .. 18 85,689 
• 18 It 19 57,599 
• 19 "20 71,271 
• 20 12/51/20 83,026 
1/1/1981 t012/31/21 1:2'.901 
.. S2 167,4$.1 
• 23 ftl_-64tO., 
• 24 255,020 
.. 95 283,955 
• 26 311,305 
" a7 388,734 
n S8 352,929 
• 89 391,799 
0-,-
2,264 
2,651 
2,791 
2,777 
2,977 
2,797 
2,366 
2,519 
3,644 
',849 
5.172 
5,651 
5,867 
5,993 
6,128 
6,529 
8,056 
10,299 
Truck .• 
L1gb:b 
1,680 
2,448 
3,067 
4,867 
7,738 
9,412 
9,953 
11,539 
13,516 
18,429 
22,549 
26,145 
29,365 
32,013 
33,802 
M,376 
35 .. 685 
37,349 
bucks 
Heavy 
1,153 
1,759 
1,977 
2,517 
3,792 
1.4&$ 
6,648 
8,007 
9,316 
10,810 
11,946 
13,907 
15,566 
16,247 
17,278 
17,687 
18,743 
20,247 
Date 
1/1/1930 
It 31 
... 32 
" 
33 
ft 34 
" 35 It 36 
It 37 
It :S8 
., 39 
If 40 
.. 41 
It 42 
tt 43 
tI 44 
.. 45 
If 46 
" 47 .. 48 
tt 49 
It 50 
" 51 
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TABLE XV 
MOTOR VEHICLES LICENSED BY THE CITY OF CHICAGO 
MAY 1, 1912 TO DECEMBER 31, 1951 (Oontinued) 
Passenger Autos Over Light Heavy 
35 HP or le8s 35 HP Trucks Trucks 
395,301 11,615 36,129 20,622 
.09,878 13,908 36,245 20,394 
382,671 14,112 34,287 17,641 
354,337 13,065 31,830 16,891 
356,054 12,531 30,980 17,914 
385,305 11,718 32,922 18,790 
448,820 12,707 35,032 22,704 
489,'80 ;14,427 34,206 26,158 
490,900 15,171 32,437 26,405 
500,251 15,877 32,223 26,480 
5S2,2~3 17,244 32,045 27,476 
566,226 19,.99S 31,772 28,524 
525,725 20,052 25,691 32,768 
'49,002 18,441 22,581 31,603 
415,414 18,466 20,775 31,792 
409,794 17,.985 21 .. 490 32,361 
442,124 19,597 24,157 36,043 
490,381 22,459 25,569 40,'140 
539,697 28,029 70,199 
598,846 35,506 '11.464 
65a.925 48,272 74,382 
66a.157 do,SS8 "'6,624 
B~tween 1932 and 1931 the number ot licensed autos rose 
trom 396,783 to 734,785 an inerease ot over 85.2 per cent. Any 
mature resident ot the oity need not view these tigures to realize 
the growth ot automobile ownership and use. The streets are 
jammed with parked and moving vehicles at all hours. '!'he crucial 
time ot street oongestion is ot course the rush hours. Trattic 
at these times i8 stagnated beyond all rhyme or reason. 
* Bureau ot Automobile Registrations, City 01' 
Chicago. 
, 
Transit'. loss ot riders has not only deprived ~em ot 
income but has abe1#ted the rise in traffic. Traffic congestion 
also adds to transit costs since it requires an inorease in the 
soheduled time tor transportation vehicles to traverse the streets 
to their de~tlnation. 
PUBLIO OWNERSHIP 
With obsolete equipment. tratfic congestion, rising 
costa, and declining riding the possibility ot securing reorgani-
zation of the translttaoilities under private enterprise became 
more and more an impossibility_ P:Plvate oapi tal ~uld not assume 
the risk inherent in investing in' a decl'ning industry without a 
strong assurance ot satety_ When all ettorts tailed to organize 
• privately owned unified transit system. Mayor Edward Kelly pro-
posed on Ootober 13, 1943, that public ownership and operation be 
examined as a means ot t'urn1sh1ng transports. tion. 
On lfo".m"bfJr 17, 1943, the City Council ot the City or 
Ohicago approved 111 pvinoiple the Mayor's proposal. and authoriaed 
the Committee on Local ~ransportation and the Mayor to investigate 
the possibIlities. Negotiations were commenced with a committee 
appoInted by the Presiding Otficer ot the District Court ot the 
United States, in which both the Surtace Lines and the Rapid 
Trans! t Oompany .ere engaged in reorganization plans. The judge 
betore whom the proceedings were pending suggested to the Mayor ot 
Chioago and the Governor ot the State that they cooperate to bring 
the plans for reorganization to an early oonolusion. 
On February 17. 1945, the Mayor and the Governor met and 
issued a joInt statement outlining a publIc corporation to own and 
operate the tranaportation faoilities. This program was approved 
in prinoiple by the City Council, and enabling legislation was pre-
pared and introduced into the General Assembly ot Illinois. 
In general. the bills presented to the legislature, sub-
sequently enacted by the 64th General Assembly. (1) created the 
Ohioago ~anslt Authority as a munioipal corporation} (2) amended 
certain sections of the Publio Utility Act to exclude and exempt a 
publicly owned utility Erom oontrol by th4 Illinois Commerce 
CommiSSion, (3) exempted publicly owned transit trom state propertj 
tax by amending Section 19 ot the Revenue Act at Illinois; (4) 
amended Sections 15-2 and 70-5 ot the Cities and Villages Aot and 
added Section 23-28.1 to authorize public authorities tor loeal 
transit to own and operate systems When approved by referendum; 
(5) amended Section 7 ot the Chioago Park Distriot Act to permit 
use ot boulevards by motor busses ot the Chicago Transit Authori ty 
~1thout permission ot the Park Board but with payment for such use 
(6) amended Sections 1 and 2 or the Park District Act to permit 
the Park District to authorize the construction and operation of 
electric railways in any park under its control.. These Acts 
were passed by the Assembly on either April 5, 1945, or June 28. 
1945 and were approved by Governor Green on April 12, 1945 and 
July 24, 1945. 
The Chicago City Council passed an enabling ordinance 
on April 23, 1945, which granted the Chicago Transit Authority 
the exclusive right to acquire, construct, maintain and opernte 
local transit £acilities for fifty years. On April 30, 1945, it 
waa approved by the Mayor. On June 4, 1945, at an election it 
was approved by referendum 285,596 in favor and 46,594 against. 
With the oompletion of preliminary legislation and 
compliance with the suggestions of the Federal Securities and Ex-
change Comrnissionts recommendations, regarding securities the 
Chicago TransIt Board was appointec. to seek fulfillment of the 
plan.. The Transit Board labored two yeara to perfect the plans, 
obtain capital funds of $105,000,000, and to efteot the p\wchase. 
CHAPTER IX 
IMPORTANT PROVISIONS OF THE ACT AND COMMENT 
!he Chicago Transit Authority Act ereated a selt regulat 
ins municipal corporation Which 1s a separate entity from all 
other governmental agencies. The governing or regulating body Is 
the Chlcago Transit Board composed ot seven membera. Three mem-
bers are appointed by the Governor ot Illinois with tbe consent of 
the Senate and tour members are appointed by the Mayor of Chioago 
wi th the consent ot the 01 tY' Oounc!l. The Governor and the Mayor 
must conour in appointmentc. The terms of the inl tial members 
were staggered but.aeh successor servea for seven ,.ears, unless 
remove. tor incompetenoy, negleot ot dut,., or malteasance. 
The Board 1s obliged uas promptly as possible. to re-
habilItate. reoonstruot and modernize all portions of any trans-
portation 8ystem aequire4 by the Authority ••• - To achieve this 
goal the Board baa power to fix the rat. of tare. The fare must 
be sutticient to pay all expenses, 8ince there 1s no provision tor 
substantial aId in the torm ot direct subsidy from any source. 
The Board is also re~uired to: 
(1) make all rule. and regulations necessary for the 
operation of transit; 
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(2) adopt rules and proc~dl~es ~or oompetitive bids on 
purchases exceeding $2,500. Whenever possible 
oontraots involv~ less than $2,500 must also be 
by competitive bid. 
(3) olassity all positions of regular employment. and 
make rules tor advancement and appointment on the 
basis of merit and effioiency. 
THE POWERS OF ~ CHICAGO TRANSIT AUTHORITY AND BOARD. 
The first is obviously the power to operate unified 
transit in the Ohioago area. The Authority may acquire other 
loeal transit companies by purchase or it may lease them. In the 
course of furnishing inter-urban transit the Authority may use 
any publie way in the metropolitan area. To do these things the 
Authority is empowered to issue bonds payable out o~ operating 
revenues solely, and to borrow money tor modernization or acquisi-
tion ot other transit compani.s. 
The estimated purchase price of the Ohicago Surfaoe 
Lines was .75,000,000, and the estimated price ot the Elevated 
was $13,100,850. The estimated total of $S8.100,850 was subject 
to adjustment and the ultimate cost of the two systems was $87, 
16a,500. However, net cost approximated $62,000,000 since $25, 
000,000 ~en.wal fund of the Surtace Lines was acquired with the 
purohase. 
The proceedings, resolutions, and ordinances of the 
Oh1oago Trans1t Authority are open to public inspection and are 
public doouments. However, records of documents kept or prepared 
tor negotiation, legal aotion or prooeedings which involve the 
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Authority are excepted. 
TRANSIT PROBLEM UnSOLVED 
The Chicago Transit Authority like al~ human institu-
tions 1s not perfect. The AuJlihol'ity has not solved the transpor .... 
tation problem of the City of Chioago. But it i8 illogical to 
assume that those active in the birth 01' publioly owned transit 
in Ghicago felt.it would solve this problem. 
The deoision to seek publio ownership wasn't reaohed 
quiokly or easily; it developed £rom a very early sowing. For 
many years the oity had sought to purchase the means ot transit. 
It seems reasonable that the finanoial eX'isGs through whioh the 
company had passed, together with the prospeot of deolining pass-
enger volumos due to automobile oompetition and inoreasing operat-
ing oosts oombined to create a situation Where some drastic 
aotion was needed if publio transportation were to survive. 
The major objeotive ot the publioly owned Chicago 
Transit System, in the author's opinion, was the survival 01' 
•• sential publio tranaportation~ without recourse to direot tax 
auppaPted subsidy. Privately owned transit could no longer till 
the need. Passengers were foraaking publio transit and costs 
were increasing. If the substantial minority who couldn't afford 
private auto transportation, or preferred public transportation to 
battling ever increasing traffic, were to continue to have this 
vital public service, then a government body must prov1de it. 
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The major objectives, then, was achieved when the Chicago Transit 
Authority. assumed control of the major transit facilities in 
Chicago. 
The creation of tile Public Authority was not the end 
sought by any agency, publ1c or pr1vate, rather it was sought as 
a means of preserving mass transit tor the people of Chicago. 
Chicago today has its system of public transportation. Althouch 
many American cities still have privately owned transit systems, 
they may sooner or later be compelled to follow Cb1cago f s 
solution of itts transit problem. 
• 
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